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A COURT PURE AND UNSULLIED: JUSTICE IN THE 
JUSTICE TRIAL AT NUREMBERG*  
Hon. Stephen J. Sfekas** 
Therefore, O Citizens, I bid ye bow	
In awe to this command, Let no man live 
Uncurbed by law nor curbed by tyranny . . . . 
Thus I ordain it now, a [] court	
Pure and unsullied . . . .1	
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the common 
understanding was that the Nazi regime had been maintained by a 
combination of instruments of terror, such as the Gestapo, the SS, and 
concentration camps, combined with a sophisticated propaganda 
campaign.2  Modern historiography, however, has revealed the 
critical importance of the judiciary, the Justice Ministry, and the legal 
profession to maintaining the stability of the regime.3 
As an example, although the number of persons confined to 
concentration camps from 1933 to 1934 rose to as many as 100,000 
people, most were quickly released.4  The number of concentration 
camp inmates thereafter fell to 4,000–5,000 persons at any given time 
during the 1930s.5  However, the number of political prisoners 
sentenced by the civilian courts had risen to 23,000 by the mid-
 
* Portions of this article will be published as a chapter under the title “Taming the 
Furies: The Justice Trial at Nuremberg-1947” in Advances in International Law and 
Jurisprudence: New Roles for the Judiciary in Upholding the Rule of Law, coeditors 
Prof. Thomas Boudreau, Ph.D., and Dr. Prof. Juan Carlos Sainz-Borga, to be 
published by The Elias-Clark Group, 2017. 
** Stephen J. Sfekas is a Senior Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, 
Maryland.  He received a BSFS from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown 
University in 1968, an M.A. in history from Yale University in 1972, and a J.D. 
from the Georgetown University Law Center in 1973. 
1. AESCHYLUS, The Furies, in THE ORESTEIA TRILOGY 138 (Alan Weissman ed., E.D.A. 
Morshead trans., Dover Thrift ed. 1996) (1909) (emphasis added). 
2. RICHARD J. EVANS, THE THIRD REICH IN HISTORY AND MEMORY 100–05 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2015). 
3. Id. at 100–02. 
4. Id. at 100. 
5. See id. 
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1930s.6  What is most striking about this phenomenon is that most 
judges and lawyers in 1933 were not in fact members of the Nazi 
Party, and, as the Nazi regime lasted only for twelve years (1933–
1945), the great majority of the legal profession up to the very end of 
the regime had been trained prior to the Nazi accession to power.7 
As the legal profession loomed large in the operation of the regime, 
it also loomed large in the post-war war crime trials at Nuremberg.  
Five of the twenty-two defendants in the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT), were lawyers, including: Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the 
head of the Reich Security Office (the Gestapo, the SD, and the 
concentration camps);8 Hans Frank, general counsel to the Nazi 
Party, and later head of the Government General of Poland;9 Arthur 
Seyss-Inquart, who as chancellor of Austria for a short time, signed 
the agreement by which Austria was annexed by Germany, and later 
was head of  the occupation of the Netherlands;10 Wilhelm Frick, 
who was Minister of the Interior until 1943 when he became the 
governor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (now the 
Czech Republic), from 1943 to 1945;11 and Constantin Von Neurath, 
Foreign Minister of Germany from 1932–1938, and governor of the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from 1939 to 1943.12  All five 
of the IMT lawyer defendants were convicted of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.13 
In the twelve subsequent trials conducted by American authorities 
at Nuremberg, under the leadership of Telford Taylor (chief of 
prosecution), generally referred to as the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals (NMT), a large number of second level Germans were tried 
on a variety of charges.14  The third trial, United States v. Altstötter, 
 
6. Id. at 101. 
7. INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 38–39 (Deborah 
Lucas Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (1987). 
8. THOMAS J. SHAW, WORLD WAR II LAW AND LAWYERS: ISSUES, CASES, AND 
CHARACTERS 420–21 (2013). 
9. Id. at 419–20; see also ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 495 (1983); 
IAN KERSHAW, HITLER: 1936-1945: NEMESIS 239 (2000). 
10. SHAW, supra note 8, at 285–88. 
11. Id. at 344. 
12. Id. at 342; TUSA & TUSA, supra note 9, at 498–99. 
13. SHAW, supra note 8, at 288, 342, 344, 420–21.  See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE 
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (Skyhorse Publ’g, Inc. 
2013) (1993) [hereinafter TAYLOR I] (providing an excellent account of the IMT); 
TUSA & TUSA, supra note 9 (providing additional accounts of the IMT).  
14. KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1–2 (2011); TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949) [hereinafter TAYLOR II].  Heller and Taylor provide the 
best overall treatment of the twelve Nuremberg Military Tribunals.  Taylor’s work is 
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which is the subject of this article, has come to be known as the 
“Justice Trial” because the sixteen original defendants were 
prominent judges, prosecutors, and Justice Ministry officials of the 
Nazi regime.15 
Telford Taylor, who would serve as chief of prosecution for all of 
the trials and who would deliver the opening statement in the Justice 
Trial, commented that this trial would be of particular interest to 
lawyers and judges because of the anomaly that judges and 
prosecutors of one country were trying judges and prosecutors from 
another country for crimes committed within the judicial process.16  
Indeed, German judges and justice officials were tried on German 
soil, in many cases for crimes against German citizens and for acts of 
injustice apparently sanctioned under German law.17  
The trial permits an exploration of the problem of what constitutes 
justice from the perspectives of both the Americans conducting the 
 
an excellent, near contemporary account of the trials by the chief prosecutor in the 
NMT trials.  The twelve trials produced 132,855 pages of transcript, from 1,300 
witnesses and 30,000 documents.  The judgments in the twelve trials run to 3,828 
pages.  HELLER, supra note 14, at 3.  Taylor felt strongly that the record of the cases 
should be readily available to document the proceedings of the court, however, the 
sheer volume of material made it impracticable to publish the entirety of the trials.  
Therefore, after completion of the trials, his staff combed through the transcript to 
put together an edited version of the most important components of the transcript, 
key documents, and the final opinion.  See generally 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 
10 (1951) [hereinafter JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT] (consisting of 1,250 pages excepted 
from the record of the Justice Trial). 
15. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 3.  Early on, Taylor decided that each trial 
would focus on particular groups from elite German society, rather than on particular 
events or subject matters.  Thus, Trial I was the “Doctor’s Trial,” which involved the 
medical officials who had authorized or undertaken medical experiments of doubtful 
scientific value, or engaged in involuntary euthanasia of so-called undesirable 
populations.  In addition, there were trials of high ranking German officers (“High 
Command Trial”), German commanders in the Balkans (“Hostages Trial”), industrial 
leaders (“Krupp Trial,” “I.G. Farben Trial,” and “Flick Trial”), the senior 
professional civil service (“Ministries Trial”), special police units (“Einsatzgruppen 
Trial”), and of course, the Justice Trial of German judges and justice officials.  See 
generally TAYLOR II, supra note 14, at 159–217 (discussing the organization of 
grouped trials). 
16. TAYLOR II, supra note 14, at 110–12.  
17. See id. at 169.  Unfortunately, this trial would have been mostly forgotten if not for 
the film Judgment at Nuremberg, which was based largely on this trial (indeed, the 
prosecution’s opening statement in the movie is verbatim from the first several pages 
of Taylor’s opening), and, but for the recent revival of interest in the Nuremberg 
trials after the creation of war crime proceedings in the aftermath of the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and the creation of the International 
Criminal Court. 
460 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
trial and the Germans who were on trial in their capacities as judges 
or justice officials.  Indeed, this trial can best be interpreted as an 
attempt to establish universal standards of justice: one that would 
both govern the way the trial was conducted as well as one to which 
the German judicial officials would be held accountable. 
The trial poses three questions.  First, was the trial procedurally 
fair?  As the court’s opinion implicitly set forth the minimum criteria 
for a fair trial, the trial itself establishes the test for the fairness of its 
own processes.  This question is of particular interest in that the IMT 
and NMT trials took place before the landmark equal protection, due 
process, and criminal law decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court.  Second, was the trial substantively fair?  That is, were the 
defendants charged and convicted of crimes recognized as such under 
international law?  Third, regardless of legal culpability, was justice 
done?  Of particular interest are the arguments in mitigation raised by 
the defendants and the subsequent impact of the NMT trials. 
The thesis of this article is that the NMT trials in general and the 
Justice Trial in particular were procedurally and substantively fair.  
Indeed, the German defendants were in some cases afforded 
procedural protections that would not be constitutionally required 
under American law until the criminal law decisions of the Supreme 
Court almost two decades later.18  Similarly, the substantive charges 
were justified under international law despite the novelty of the 
charge of crimes against humanity.19  Finally, despite the early 
termination of sentences, justice was done.20 
Part II will briefly describe the evolution of the German legal 
system during the pre-war Nazi years.21  Part III will describe the 
development of the international war crimes program under the 
London Charter, Allied Control Council Law Number 10 (ACC 10), 
and Office of Military Government-Germany, United States 
Ordinance No. 7 (OMGUS 7).22  Part IV will recount the Justice Trial 
and its aftermath.23  Part V will address the three questions posed in 
this introduction.24 
 
18. See infra Sections V.A–B. 
19. See infra Section V.B. 
20. See infra Part V.C. 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See infra Part V. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
THE PRE-WAR NAZI YEARS 
I sit in one of the dives 
On Fifty-Second Street 
Uncertain and afraid 
As the clever hopes expire 
Of a low dishonest decade . . . .25 
Before the Nazi accession to power in 1933, Germany had a well-
established, internationally respected legal system.  It had the rule of 
law, enforcement of contracts, protection of rights, and other features 
of western European legal systems of the time.26  However, certain 
features of the German legal system left it vulnerable to the kinds of 
changes that took place in the Nazi era.     
The system had grown up in the authoritarian and positivist 
traditions of the German Empire.  The judiciary never came to terms 
with the fall of the German Empire and the establishment of the 
Weimar Republic and democratic norms after World War I.27  As an 
example, German judges (recruited from the judicial track at German 
law schools), had to serve an initial unpaid and untenured 
probationary period of several years before reaching full judicial 
status.28  Therefore, judicial candidates had to have independent 
means of financial support during the probationary period.  The lack 
of tenure also meant that politically or ethnically marginal persons 
could be weeded out before they could finish the probationary 
period.29  As a result, there were very few left-wing or Jewish judges, 
and left-wing agitators consistently received longer prison terms than 
conservative agitators during the 1920s.  As an example, Hitler had to 
serve only a short sentence in minimum security imprisonment after 
his abortive coup d’état in 1923.30  By contrast, the leaders of the 
People’s Republic of Bavaria, an abortive communist coup d’état, 
received lengthy sentences.31 
Furthermore, similar to other members of the German middle class, 
the judiciary lost savings during the hyperinflation of the early years 
of the Republic and lost income and status during the period of 
 
25. W.H. AUDEN, September 1, 1939, in ANOTHER TIME 98, 98 (1940) (emphasis added). 
26. See MÜLLER, supra note 7, at XV. 
27. See id. at 10. 
28. Id. at 6. 
29. Id. at 6–7. 
30. Id. at 16. 
31. Id. at 11–12. 
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budgetary austerity, which occurred at the beginning of the Great 
Depression.32  The judiciary was also inclined to blame the Republic 
for the alleged “stab in the back,” which had led to an armistice while 
German armies still occupied France and what was perceived as a 
humiliating Versailles Treaty ending World War I.33  The judiciary 
was primed for the accession to power of an authoritarian, nationalist 
alternative to the democratic parties which controlled the Weimar 
Republic.34 
Additionally, the Nazis came to power within the letter, although 
not the spirit, of the law.  Hitler was invited to form a government on 
January 30, 1933.35  He immediately called for new elections to 
secure a majority.36  On February 28, 1933, a fire of suspicious 
origins broke out in the Reichstag building.37  Hitler immediately 
blamed the Communist Party for the fire, claiming that it was a first 
step towards an overthrow of the government.38  He then invoked 
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which permitted the President 
to suspend civil liberties when faced with an internal crisis.39 
After several weeks of terror, the Nazi Party paramilitary 
organization, the Sturmabteilung (literally “Stormtroopers,” 
frequently referred to as the SA), with the acquiescence of the 
government, assaulted opposing politicians, destroyed campaign 
offices and opposition newspapers, and intimidated supporters of 
opposing parties.40  Additionally, the police arrested leaders of the 
Communist Party and harassed the leaders of the Social Democratic 
and Catholic Center Parties (the latter two being the only parties with 
 
32. Stephen J. Sfekas, The Enabler, the True Believer, the Fanatic: German Justice in 
the Third Reich, 26 J. JURIS. 189, 194 (2015). 
33. Id. 
34. See MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 12; Sfekas, supra note 32, at 195. 




39. Id.  Weimar Constitution, Article 48, section 2 reads: 
If the public safety and order in the German Reich are seriously 
disturbed or endangered, the national President may take the 
measures necessary for the restoration of public safety and order, 
and may intervene if necessary with the assistance of the armed 
forces. For this purpose he may temporarily set aside in whole or 
in part, the fundamental rights established in Articles 114, 115, 
117, 118, 123, 124, and 153. 
             Weimar [Constitution] Aug. 11, 1919, ch. 3, art. 48 (Ger.).  The latter articles were 
the German equivalent of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.  See Sfekas, supra note 32, at 195. 
40. Sfekas, supra note 32, at 195–96. 
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a genuine commitment to democracy).41  Despite this, the Nazis were 
able to get only forty-three percent of the vote.42  However, by 
combining their newly elected deputies with those of other right-wing 
parties, the Nazis acquired a working majority of the Reichstag.43  By 
intimidating the Center Party and excluding the Communist deputies 
from the Reichstag, Hitler achieved the two-thirds majority needed to 
pass the Enabling Act, which amended the Weimar Constitution to 
permit Hitler to rule by decree.44  Thus, the dictatorship was 
established.45 
The first decree passed after the Enabling Act barred Jews and 
members of the left-wing parties from the professional civil service 
and also disbarred all Jewish lawyers, with some exceptions.46  The 
remaining non-Jewish lawyers and judges were required to swear a 
personal oath to Hitler.47  There is no evidence of resistance or 
protest from the remaining judges or lawyers to any of these 
developments.48 
During the 1930s, “race” in the German sense49 became a dominant 
legal category, especially after the passage of the so-called 
Nuremberg racial laws.50  Jews were increasingly barred from the 
protections of the law and access to the courts, and were treated much 
more harshly in the criminal law.51 
Additionally, a decree in the mid-1930s permitted judges to rule on 
cases by analogy.52  If a judge felt that the specified punishment in a 
 
41. Id. at 196. 
42. IAN KERSHAW, HITLER: 1889-1936: HUBRIS 461 (1998). 
43. See id. at 461–62; Sfekas, supra note 32, at 195–96. 
44. See KERSHAW, supra note 42, at 438–39, 460–62; JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 
14, at 163. 
45. KERSHAW, supra note 42, at 436. 
46. Id. at 474–75; JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 163. 
47. MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 36–38. 
48. Id. at 37. 
49. Americans typically think of race as being a matter of skin color.  German race 
theory treated what Americans would view as ethnic groups as being separate races.  
Thus, the Germans considered Jews and Poles to be of separate races from non-
Jewish Germans, whereas Americans would not do so. 
50. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 180–81, 626–27. 
51. See id. at 1082–83, 1112–14. 
52. The Extracts from the Law of 28 June 1935 which amended the Criminal 
(Penal) Code provided:  
 Article 2 
Whoever commits an act which the law declares as 
punishable or which deserves punishment according to the 
fundamental idea of a penal law or the sound sentiment of the 
people, shall be punished.  If no specific penal law can be directly 
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criminal law was insufficiently harsh, he could analogize the offense 
to a more serious crime and impose a harsher penalty.  If the judge 
felt that an act did not violate any criminal law, but nevertheless 
objected to the defendant’s act, he could analogize the act to a 
prohibited act and find the defendant guilty anyway.  Under law by 
analogy, no one could ever be certain whether any act was illegal or 
what the penalty would be for an illegal act.53 
German law also developed the notion of the nullity plea and the 
extraordinary plea.54  In the case of the nullity plea, if a prosecutor 
felt that a penalty was insufficient, he could request that the Justice 
Ministry nullify the penalty and make it harsher.55  In the case of the 
extraordinary plea, if the prosecutor did not agree with an acquittal, 
he could ask that the acquittal be set aside and a conviction entered.56 
Early in the regime, two new courts were created.57  The Special 
Courts were created at the regional level to hear cases involving 
internal subversion.58  The People’s Courts were created at the 
national level to deal with external subversion.59  The Nazis had 
complete control over personnel of these new courts, and these courts 
were largely staffed with committed Nazis.60  Obviously, the 
jurisdiction of the two courts overlapped with one another, as well as 
 
applied to the act, it shall be punished according to the law whose 
underlying principle can be most readily applied to the act. 
 
Article 170a 
If an act deserves punishment according to the sound 
sentiment of the people, but is not declared punishable in the law, 
the prosecutor will examine whet her the underlying principle of a 
penal law can be applied to the act and whether justice can be 
helped to triumph by analogous application of that penal law. 
 
Article 267a 
If the trial shows that the defendant has committed an act 
which deserves punishment according to the sound sentiment of 
the people, but is not declared punishable by the law, the court 
will examine whether the underlying principle of a penal law 
applies to the act and whether justice can be helped to triumph by 
analogous application of that penal law. 
    Id. at 176–78. 
53. See id. 
54. Sfekas, supra note 32, at 200. 
55. Id. at 200, 214. 
56. Id. at 200–01, 214. 
57. Id. at 198. 
58. Id. at 199. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
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the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts.  Cases began to 
migrate from the ordinary criminal courts to the Special and People’s 
Courts, and ultimately, from the Special Courts to the more radical 
People’s court.61  Virtually every judge and prosecutor charged in the 
Justice Trial was associated with these two courts. 
By the time the war began, the German legal system had become a 
prime buttress of the Nazi regime.  Under the pressures of the war, 
and particularly as the war began to deteriorate for the Germans, the 
courts and the Justice Ministry became increasingly radicalized.  Law 
by analogy was used to impose draconian punishments for offenses, 
and the Justice Ministry imposed new policies, such as the Night and 
Fog program and the Law Against Poles and Jews, to intimidate and 
persecute the populations of newly occupied territories.62  Although 
in absolute numbers the total persons killed or imprisoned by the 
civilian judiciary was dwarfed by the total persons murdered by the 
SS, Gestapo, and extermination camps, the German legal system 
made its substantial contribution to the horrors of the Nazi regime.63 
III. THE LONDON CHARTER, ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, AND OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT-
GERMANY, U.S. NO. 7 
You must put no man on trial before anything that is called 
a court . . . . under the forms of judicial proceedings if you 
are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty.64 
A. The London Charter  
In 1942, the Governments-in-Exile of nine German occupied 
nations meeting at St. James Palace in London issued a call for the 
punishment of persons committing war crimes in their respective 
countries by means of “organized justice.”65  This Declaration of St. 
James received little notice, but was the first call for a trial of war 
 
61. MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 51–53; see also H.W. KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK: 
POLITICAL JUSTICE IN HITLER’S GERMANY 51–55 (1989). 
62. Sfekas, supra note 32, at 200, 204–11. 
63. The Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany estimated that civilian 
courts during the Third Reich ordered 32,000 judicial executions, the majority of 
which occurred during the war.  Koch estimated a total of 16,560.  Id. at 218–19. 
64. Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., Address at the 
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting: The Rule of Law Among 
Nations 15–16 (Apr. 13, 1945), https://www.roberthjackson.org/wpcontent/uploads/ 
 2015/01/Rule_of_Law_Among_Nations.pdf. 
65. TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 25. 
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criminals rather than summary justice.66  Subsequently, the Western 
Allies organized the United Nations War Crimes Commission to 
investigate war crimes including the “bestial policy of extermination 
of the Jewish people in Europe.”67  
In November 1943, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union met and issued the Moscow 
Declaration.68  This declaration provided that Italian Fascist chiefs 
and generals suspected of war crimes would be “arrested and handed 
over to justice,” and that Austria would be treated as a victim nation 
and not as a participant in German aggression.69  With respect to 
German war crimes there were two provisions of note.  The 
Declaration provided that: 
At the time of the granting of any armistice to any 
government which may be set up in Germany, those 
German officers and men and members of the Nazi party 
who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting 
part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will 
be sent back to the countries in which their abominable 
deeds were done in order that they may be judged and 
punished according to the laws of these liberated countries 
and of the free governments which will be created 
therein. . . . The above declaration is without prejudice to 
the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no 
particular geographical localisation and who will be 
punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the 
Allies.70 
This Declaration created the basic framework for the war crimes 
trials.  First, crimes committed by identifiable Germans in occupied 
 
66. See id. 
67. Id. at 26.  The term “United Nations” became the preferred term describing the 
Allied Powers during the war.  The Commission was not an arm of the modern day 
United Nations Organization which was created after the war.  This Commission 
would be superseded by the IMT and NMT trials and various other national tribunals 
and did not play a role in the investigation of war crimes.  However, under the 
leadership of a notable Australian jurist, Lord Robert Anderson Wright of Durley, 
the Commission collected and published law reports on all of the major international 
and national war crimes trials after the war, including the thirteen Nuremberg trials.  
Lord Wright wrote excellent analyses of the war crimes trials including an overview 
of all the trials in the fifteenth volume of the series.  See 1–15 UNITED NATIONS WAR 
CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1947–1949). 
68. See STAFF OF THE COMM. & THE DEP’T OF STATE, A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY: BASIC DOCUMENTS, 1941–49, S. DOC. NO. 123, at 9 (1st Sess. 1950). 
69. Id. at 11–13. 
70. Id. at 13–14. 
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countries would be returned to these countries for trial.  Second, there 
would be a subset of major criminals, such as Hitler himself, whose 
crimes affected all of Europe and whose fate would be settled by the 
major powers.  As the war drew to a close, the question of what to do 
with the major criminals became acute.  Among the options 
considered were: (1) summary execution of up to 50,000 German 
offenders, which was proposed by Joseph Stalin at a dinner at the 
Yalta Conference, perhaps jocularly (Winston Churchill strongly 
objected, and Franklin D. Roosevelt did not take the proposal 
seriously);71 (2) exile of the major leaders; (3) summary execution of 
the leading Nazis (this would remain the favored British position 
until the end of the London Conference in August 1945);72 (4) do 
nothing and let them go;73 and (5) an international tribunal for the 
major offenders.74 
The issue was crystallized for the Allies when word of the so-called 
Morgenthau plan leaked to the public.  This proposal by the Secretary 
of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, initially endorsed by Roosevelt 
and Churchill, would have called for the deindustrialization of 
Germany and the transformation of the country into a pastoral and 
agricultural economy.75  This proposal was heavily criticized and 
ultimately rejected.76  It did, however, result in intensified post-war 
planning.  Two key developments tipped the balance towards an 
international trial. 
The first was a memorandum proposed by Colonel Murray 
Bernays, chief of the Special Projects Branch of the War Department, 
which proposed a trial of major war criminals, along with a trial of 
criminal organizations such as the SS.77  If an organization were 
found to be a criminal enterprise, further proceedings could take 
place against former members of the organization, which could be 
limited to disposition because guilt would have been established by 
mere membership.78  
 
71. TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 29–30. 
72. Id. at 29–33. 
73. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 9, at 26. 
74. TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 28. 
75. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 9, at 50–51, 60. 
76. Id. at 60–61. 
77. See TUSA & TUSA, supra note 9, at 54–55. 
78. See COLONEL MURRAY BERNAYS, MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE ROSENMAN 2–3 (1945).  
Bernays’ memorandum set forth what would be viewed as a practical way to try the 
massive numbers of Nazi war criminals.  Although the memo would convince the 
American government of the need for war crimes trials, Bernays himself played no 
role at Nuremberg. 
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The second key development was the appointment of Justice 
Robert H. Jackson by Harry Truman (who became president after the 
death of Roosevelt on April 12, 1945) to be the chief United States 
prosecutor at the war crimes trials.79  Truman’s appointment occurred 
on May 2, 1945, and was one of Truman’s earliest and most inspired 
appointments.80 
Even at this point, Justice Jackson had had an extraordinary career.  
He first met Franklin D. Roosevelt while Roosevelt was still 
Governor of New York, and Jackson followed Roosevelt to 
Washington after he became President.81  Jackson held an 
increasingly significant number of government jobs, culminating in 
his service as Solicitor General in 1938 and U.S. Attorney General in 
1940.82  He was appointed to the Supreme Court in July 1941.83  
Most significantly was Jackson’s role in Korematsu v. United States, 
which upheld the military order that resulted in the internment of 
loyal Japanese citizens of the United States without any semblance of 
due process or indication of wrongdoing.  Jackson wrote an eloquent 
and scathing dissent denouncing the denial of due process and the use 
of racial and ethnic categories in the internment order.84  
On April 13, 1945, shortly before his appointment, Jackson gave a 
speech before the American Society of International Law, in which 
he stated: 
I am not so troubled as some seem to be over problems of 
jurisdiction of war criminals or of finding existing and 
recognized law by which standards of guilt may be 
determined.  But all experience teaches that there are certain 
things you cannot do under the guise of judicial trial.  Courts 
 
79. See TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 44–45 (stating that after Justice Jackson gave a 
speech on war crimes on April 13, 1945, President Truman expressed his wish to 
appoint Justice Jackson as the country's representative and Chief Counsel for war 
crimes). 
80. See Douglas O. Linder, The Nuremberg Trials: Chronology, FAMOUS WORLD 
TRIALS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/PROJECTS/FTRIALS/nuremberg/ 
 NurembergChronology.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
81. See generally TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 43 (discussing how Jackson met important 
people in New York such as Franklin Roosevelt and how subsequently Jackson went 
on to greater appointments such as Attorney General). 
82. Id. 
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He left Albany Law School after one year, but was able to pass the New York State 
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84. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245–46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
2017 Justice in the Justice Trial at Nuremberg 469 
 
try cases, but cases also try courts. . . . [T]here is no reason 
for a judicial trial except to reach a judgment on a 
foundation more certain than suspicion or current 
rumor. . . . But, further, you must put no man on trial if you 
are not willing to hear everything relevant that he has to say 
in his defense and to make it possible for him to obtain 
evidence from others. . . . [Y]ou must put no man on trial 
under the forms of judicial proceedings if you are not 
willing to see him freed if not proven guilty.85 
This speech, which was likely the cause of Truman’s appointment of 
Jackson,86 would be the basis of American policy.  Justice Jackson 
would lead the United States delegates to the London Conference and 
would be the dominant personality at the conference.  
In August 1945, representatives of the major Allied Powers—the 
United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union—met in 
London to determine what was to be done with the major Nazi war 
criminals.87  The London Charter, which resulted from the 
conference, set the tone and parameters for the IMT and for the NMT 
trials that followed, including the Justice Trial.  The London 
Conference dealt with three categories of issues: (1) the logistics of a 
trial, (2) the charges to be brought, and (3) the procedures, including 
rules of evidence to be used.  
1. Logistics 
The logistics issues were difficult but readily resolved.  The trial 
would be held at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, Germany, 
primarily because Nuremberg, unlike most German cities, had an 
intact courthouse connected to an intact jail, with sufficient housing 
and office space to support the personnel associated with the trial.88  
Furthermore, Nuremberg was in the U.S. zone of occupation, which 
meant that the United States, as the wealthiest of the allied countries, 
would provide the support services for the trial.89  Additionally, 
 
85. Jackson, supra note 64, at 15–16. 
86. John Q. Barrett, “One Good Man”: The Jacksonian Shape of Nuremberg, in THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945, at 129, 132 
(Herbert R. Reginbogin & Christoph J. M. Safferling eds., 2006). 
87. See TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 59. 
88. The Nuremberg Courtroom: Why Nuremberg?, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL 
MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007089 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
89. See TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 61. 
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Nuremberg had great symbolic power as the site of the annual Nazi 
Party rallies and the place where the Nuremberg racial laws were 
announced.90 
Language issues would bedevil all the proceedings, particularly the 
IMT, as all documents and all testimony had to be translated from the 
language of the original into English, French, German, and Russian, 
respectively.  Colonel Leon Dostert of the U.S. Army and engineers 
at IBM solved the language problem by developing the technologies 
of simultaneous interpretation and creating the listening and 
recording technologies by which each participant could hear the trial 
in his or her own language by earphones.91  Throughout the thirteen 
trials, the U.S. Army maintained a massive staff of interpreters to 
translate documents into the respective languages.  Telford Taylor 
notes that, at its peak, the NMT trials required a support staff of over 
1,300 persons.92 
2. The Charges  
Although the logistics issues were complex, they were not a subject 
of major division among the Allies.  The choice of charges and trial 
procedures, however, caused major difficulties and took weeks of 
negotiation to resolve.93  Jackson came to the London Conference 
convinced that the greatest evil—the one that subsumed all others—
was the waging of aggressive war itself.94  The Holocaust, war 
crimes, slave labor, displacement of populations, starvation of 
civilians, mass destruction of property, theft of art treasures, and 
sexual abuse of civilians all flowed from or were part of preparation 
for aggressive war.  Accordingly, Jackson insisted that one of the 
charges be crimes against the peace, and the other parties agreed.95  
As this was not one of the charges in the Justice Trial, this shall not 
be discussed further.  
However, Jackson also insisted on the inclusion of a separate 
charge of conspiracy to wage aggressive war, as well as charges of 
 
90. Id. 
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School of Languages and Linguistics at Georgetown University.  FRANCESCA GAIBA, 
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94. See TAYLOR I, supra note 13, at 66–67, 76–77 (discussing Jackson’s strong feelings 
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95. Id. at 65–66, 76–77; TAYLOR II, supra note 14, at 139–40. 
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war crimes and crimes against humanity.96  The conspiracy charge 
would be a controversial component of all the trials.  The difficulty 
with conspiracy as an independent charge is that conspiracy, although 
a part of the common law tradition of the United States and the 
United Kingdom, is not part of the civil law tradition of France, 
Germany, the Soviet Union, or most of the other belligerent powers.97  
The French, in particular, argued that conspiracy was not part of the 
customs of war or of customary international law since it was not 
accepted as law by the legal system used by the majority of affected 
countries.98  This issue was important because the charges of crimes 
against the peace required the actual invasion of a country.  Thus, the 
charge would only apply to events immediately leading up to 
September 1, 1939, the day that Germany attacked Poland, and the 
events and persons directly involved in planning and implementing 
the invasion.99 
Jackson’s conception was much broader.  In his view, everything 
leading up to the beginning of the war, including the Nazi seizure of 
power, the rearmament of Germany, the expansion of the Army, the 
persecution of Jews and political opponents in Germany, were all part 
of a plan leading to the initiation of war.100  Furthermore Jackson 
believed that the subsequent war crimes were a continuation of the 
same conspiracy.101  The British shared Jackson’s perspective on the 
law of conspiracy, but the French and Soviets strongly opposed it.102  
The issue was resolved by an agreement that the charge of conspiracy 
would be limited to crimes against the peace, but would not extend to 
war crimes or crimes against humanity.103 
The second problem with the charges arose out of the limitations 
on the traditional notion of war crimes.  Unlike the other charges in 
the indictments, a body of law relating to war crimes had developed 
by 1945.104  Prior to 1863, war crimes were primarily a matter of 
customary international law based on “the laws and customs of war 
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among civilized nations.”105  During the American Civil War, 
Abraham Lincoln commissioned Francis Lieber, a legal scholar, to 
develop a code of conduct for Union armies to deal with the Southern 
armies and the hostile civilian population.106  The resulting code, 
known generally as “Lieber’s Code” and more recently and more 
appropriately known as “Lincoln’s Code,” was incorporated into 
General Order Number 100 and was issued by President Lincoln to 
govern the conduct of all armies in the American Civil War.107 
For the first time, this code attempted to clarify and set out the law 
of war.  The code was viewed as a significant success, and it was 
gradually adopted by European countries to govern the conduct of 
their armed forces in times of war.108  Lincoln’s Code thereafter 
became one of the primary sources for the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907.109  Prior to World War II, there was further 
modification of Lincoln’s Code in the Geneva Convention of 1929.110  
The laws of war, as defined by these treaties, had a number of 
important limitations which complicated the effort to bring the 
defendants to justice.  First, the laws of war require a war; second, the 
war must be between belligerent powers.111  Thus, the laws of war as 
declared in the Conventions would not apply at all before September 
1, 1939, nor would they apply to offenses committed by Germany in 
Germany or on German allies.  As an example, the persecution of 
Jews in Czechoslovakia or Austria would not be a war crime because 
both countries had been absorbed by Germany prior to September 1, 
1939, and the absorption had not been contested by the international 
community.  Similarly, the persecution and extermination of Jews in 
Hungary after April 1944, would not have been a war crime as 
Hungary technically was an ally of Germany. 
To deal with this issue, the London Conference concluded that 
certain offenses of a sufficiently substantial nature associated with 
war crimes or the waging of war would constitute crimes against 
humanity.  Indeed, the Hague Convention notes in the preamble that: 
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Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, 
the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in 
cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection 
and empire of the principles of international law, as they 
result from the usages established between civilized nations, 
from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the 
public conscience.112 
Thus, the Hague Conventions were not intended to be a 
comprehensive declaration of all the rules of war or of “the laws of 
humanity[] and the requirements of the public conscience.”  
Therefore, the London Conference concluded that international law 
encompassed the offense of “crimes against humanity.”113  However, 
the London Charter put an important limitation on this charge, one 
that would change significantly in Allied Control Council Law No. 
10 and OMGUS 7, which covered the NMT Trials.  Under the 
London Charter, a crime against humanity was: 
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated.114 
Thus, a crime against humanity within the contemplation of the 
London Charter could be committed before the war or in Germany or 
in its allies, regardless of the domestic law of Germany, if it were “in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal.”115  A crime against humanity, therefore was 
predicated on the commission of a separate crime within the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction (i.e., war crimes, crimes against the peace or 
conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace).  As Jackson’s 
conception of the conspiracy charge incorporated acts as early as 
 
112. Id. at 248. 
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474 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
January 30, 1933, a crime against humanity could include acts 
committed in Germany or Greater Germany or German allies from 
1933 onward. 
3. Procedures  
The differences between civil law and common law traditions 
presented a major problem in designing the procedures to be used in 
the IMT.  Common law criminal trials, such as those of the United 
States and Great Britain, rely on the prosecution to present evidence 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.116  The 
indictment, therefore, is short and intended to provide notice of the 
charge only.117  The defense has the right to cross-examine or to 
present evidence of its own.118  The judge’s involvement is limited to 
rulings on the law, admissibility of evidence, and asking clarifying 
questions.119  Before the decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), the defendants in American courts had extremely limited 
discovery, so trial by surprise was routine.120 
In the civil law tradition, the prosecutor prepares a lengthy and 
detailed indictment with relevant documents attached and witness 
affidavits summarizing the testimony of each of the witnesses to be 
called.121  The defense may suggest additional witnesses and 
documents, but the defense receives complete discovery when it 
receives the indictment.122  The trial is conducted before a multi-
judge panel.123  One of the judges reviews the indictment and 
accompanying materials and decides whether the case should move 
forward.124  The judges then decide which witnesses will be heard in 
person, and the court conducts the questioning.125  Thus, the lawyers 
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are relatively passive and the judges play the most active role in 
prosecuting the case.126 
The London Charter authorized judges to develop rules of 
procedure to govern the IMT.  The rules of procedure, as in civil law 
practice at the time, provided for: (1) the right to counsel of the 
defendant’s choice; (2) the appointment of counsel if the defendant 
did not have one; (3) the right of the defendant to compulsory 
process; (4) the right of the defendant to receive copies of all the 
documents made a part of the indictment and have access to other 
documents in the prosecution’s possession translated into German.127  
It should be noted that these rules of procedure were adopted prior to 
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 93 (1963), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), so that defendants were accorded more rights than the 
existing constitutional minimums in American law at the time.128 
In practice, the IMT used a hybrid between civil and common law 
principles for the presentation of cases.129  Notably, the case did not 
rely on strict rules of evidence.130  The prosecution relied heavily on 
captured German documents, which were organized into evidence 
books with affidavits explaining where and when the documents were 
discovered and certifying the accuracy of translation.131  The practice 
of having the prosecutor read portions of the document into the 
record and make an oral presentation of the significance of the 
document packet also developed.  Much of the testimony in both 
cases was by way of affidavit.132  However, the parties had the right 
to require a party to call a witness who had rendered an affidavit.  A 
version of this practice was to be used in the NMT trials.133  
The trial lasted from November 1945 through July 1946.134  
Nineteen of the twenty-two defendants were found guilty.135  Twelve 
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received death sentences, three received life sentences, four received 
a significant sentence, and three were acquitted.136 
B. Allied Control Council Law No. 10 
It had always been contemplated that the IMT would be the first 
trial of major Nazi war criminals, but that others would likely follow.  
However, the logistical, cultural, and legal difficulties of conducting 
a lengthy and complex trial in four languages with hybrid procedures 
and law derived from two different systems of law caused widespread 
reluctance at the prospect of repeating the experience.137  Justice 
Jackson ultimately decided that the United States would not 
participate in a following trial under the same circumstances.138 
The Allied Control Council, which consisted of the commanders of 
the four occupying armies in Germany, issued Allied Control Council 
Law Number 10 (ACC 10), which established a new process for 
trying the remaining major war criminals.139  Under ACC 10, 
responsibility for future trials would be in the hands of the respective 
occupation zones.140  The occupying authority in each zone would 
have the ability to convene a military tribunal to try German 
defendants within its custody under the general framework of ACC 
10.141  ACC 10 set forth a number of general principles regarding 
subsequent trials:  
1. The occupying authorities other than the occupying zone 
conducting the trial would give full cooperation in 
transferring defendants, serving subpoenas, and 
producing witnesses and documents.142 
2. The principles and provisions of the Moscow 
Declaration and the London Charter were incorporated 
by reference into the directive.143 
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Most importantly however, ACC 10 clearly defined the scope of 
jurisdiction of the subsequent trials in Article II and the specifications 
of the crimes with which the defendant could be charged.144 
Article II, Section (a) set forth the crime of “crimes against the 
peace” and used the same definition as the London Charter.145  
Similarly, Article II, Section (b) defined war crimes in the same 
manner as the London Charter.146 
The third crime, crimes against humanity, as set forth in Article II, 
Section (c) differed in important respects from the definition in the 
London Charter.  The definition of the crime in Article 6 of the 
London Charter included “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts . . . in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”147  
However, the corresponding language of ACC 10 reads “[a]trocities 
and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape or other 
inhumane acts . . . .” and dropped the limiting clause “in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”148 
The definition of ACC 10 therefore is substantially broader than the 
definition of the London Charter in important respects.  First, the list 
of acts constituting acts against humanity is broadened to include 
imprisonment, torture, and rape.  The inclusion of rape is of some 
note given the massive number of sexual assaults by the Red Army 
during its invasion of Germany and to a lesser extent by the French 
Army.149  
The specific reference to imprisonment also makes it clear that the 
acts of German judges, prosecutors, and other justice officials would 
fall within the jurisdiction of the court.  The definition by inclusion of 
the term “including but not limited to” also makes clear that the 
offenses which follow are intended as examples of the crimes, not a 
comprehensive listing of the elements of the crime. 
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The deletion of the reference to “in execution of or in connection 
with any crime” represented an evolution of thinking as to what 
constituted crimes against humanity.  There had been concerns at the 
London Conference about crimes against humanity.150  Were they 
simply a logical extension of war crimes and therefore within the 
tradition of international law, or were they, in fact, a new crime?  If 
the latter, the defendants might have a strong argument about the ex 
post facto application of the law.  The “in connection with” language 
therefore emphasized that this was a natural extension of existing law 
rather than a new law. 
As did the definition in the London Charter, crimes against 
humanity in ACC 10 applied to any civilian population, including 
offenses against German civilians, “whether or not in violation of the 
domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.”151  The directive 
also stated that the defendant’s official position would not free the 
defendant from criminal responsibility, and the fact that a defendant 
was following orders did not constitute a defense to charges but 
might be considered in mitigation.152 
From the perspective of judges and defense counsel, the definitions 
of the crimes created serious problems.  The defendants might have 
defenses against the charge of war crimes since the crime requires 
there to be a war and applies only to offenses committed against 
belligerent populations.  By September 1, 1939, the day that World 
War II began, Austria and Czechoslovakia had already been 
incorporated into greater Germany.153  After the conquest of Poland, 
portions of Poland known as the “Incorporated Eastern Territories” 
were formally incorporated into Germany.154  Therefore, offenses 
committed in the former Austria, Czechoslovakia and the 
incorporated portions of Poland arguably were taking place in 
Germany, and thus were not war crimes.  Most of the actions of the 
defendants in fact took place in Germany so defined. 
Crimes against humanity, however, were not limited as to place 
since the definition applied to any population.  The offense did not 
require the existence of a war, meaning acts before September 1, 
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1939, arguably could be charged.155  Finally, the exclusion of reliance 
on the domestic law as an excuse eliminated an additional defense.156   
The definition of a crime against the peace included a specific 
statement that “participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing” would also be an offense.  
There is no such reference to conspiracy in the definition of war 
crime or crimes against humanity.157 
The final potential charge was membership in an organization 
found to be a criminal organization by the IMT.  Liability, however, 
would be established only if the defendant knew of the criminal 
nature of the organization.158 
ACC 10 did not establish trial procedures nor even require any of 
the occupying authorities to take any particular action.  In response, 
the British, for example, issued a royal warrant limiting further 
prosecutions to trials of war crimes, especially those associated with 
British citizens.159  Similarly, the French conducted trials in their 
zone only for crimes committed in France during the occupation 
period.160 
The United States, however, decided to continue the prosecution of 
major war criminals under ACC 10.  In response to ACC 10, the 
Office of the Military Government-Germany, United States 
(OMGUS) issued Ordinance Number 7 (OMGUS 7), which 
established the procedures for the conduct of the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals to be held in the American zone.161 
OMGUS 7 ostensibly was intended to implement ACC 10, but not 
to make substantive changes in its provisions.  Yet, the ordinance 
altered ACC 10 in its first sentence, which reads: “The purpose of 
this Ordinance is to provide for the establishment of military tribunals 
which shall have power to try and punish persons charged with 
offenses recognized as crimes in Article II of Control Council Law 
No. 10, including conspiracies to commit any such crimes.”162 
 
155. See ACC 10, supra note 139, at 251 (listing the required elements of the offenses). 
156. See id. at 250. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 250–51. 
159. See generally id. at 254–257 (stating the regulations for governing the trials of war 
criminals). 
160. 3 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 100–02 (1948) (discussing Ordinance No. 36 of February 25, 1946 by 
the French Commander-in-Chief). 
161. Office of the Military Government-Germany, United States Zone, Ordinance No. 7, 
art. I (effective on Oct. 18, 1946), reprinted in TAYLOR II, supra note 14, at 286 
[hereinafter OMGUS 7]. 
162. Id. 
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However, ACC 10 and the London Charter recognized conspiracy 
only with respect to crimes against the peace, but not as part of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.  The balance of the OMGUS 7 
would be less controversial.   
Article II established the tribunals.  The tribunals would consist of 
three judges and one alternate judge.163  Each judge would have to be 
a member of the bar in good standing of any American jurisdiction 
with at least five years’ experience.164  As a practical matter, the great 
majority of the judges were current or retired judges of state appellate 
courts.165 Article IV sets forth basic precepts of the trials: 
1. The defendant would receive copies of the indictment 
and of relevant documents at a reasonable time, 
translated into German; 
2. The trial would be conducted in or translated into 
German; 
3. The defendant would have the right to counsel of his 
own choice, and the court would appoint counsel for 
anyone unrepresented.  The counsel would be 
compensated by the occupying forces; 
4. The defendant would have the right to be present at all 
stages of the proceeding; 
5. The defendant would have the right to present evidence 
on his own behalf and cross-examine prosecution 
witnesses; 
6. The defendant would have the right to request the 
tribunal to produce witnesses or documents.166 
Additionally, the tribunal would have the power to issue 
subpoenas, administer oaths, or to impose sanctions for contempt of 
court.167  Article XI set forth the order of proceedings.168 
Article VII is of particular interest as it lays out the rules of 
evidence.  It states that the tribunal would not be bound by the 




165. HELLER, supra note 14, at 41.  Heller includes brief biographical material as to each 
participating judge.  Id. at 85–105.  Chief Justice Carl Vinson would not permit any 
sitting federal judge to participate in the Nuremberg trials as he felt the federal court 
case load was too great to permit federal judges to be absent from their duties for 
extended periods of time.  Id. at 41. 
166. See OMGUS 7, supra note 161, at 287. 
167. See id. at 288. 
168. Id. at 289. 
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the record which it deems to have probative value.169  The tribunals 
were specifically authorized to admit: “affidavits, depositions, 
interrogations [the term “interrogations” likely refers to 
interrogations performed by military intelligence], and other 
statements, diaries, letters, the records, findings, statements and 
judgments of the military tribunals . . . .”170  However, the opposing 
party must be given an opportunity to question the affidavit or 
probative value of such evidence.171  In most respects, the evidentiary 
rule laid out in OMGUS 7 closely resembles the rules typical of 
federal and state administrative hearings.172  In general, the trial 
would be conducted in accordance with proceedings in American or 
British courts. 
IV. THE TRIAL 
But a court is far more than a courtroom; it is a process 
and a spirit.  It is the house of law.  This the defendants 
know, or must have known in times past.  I doubt that they 
ever forgot it.173 
A. The Defendants, Lawyers, and Judges 
The sixteen defendants were largely judges and prosecutors of the 
People’s Court and Special Courts and the balance were officials of 
the Ministry of Justice, specifically: 
1. Judges of the Peoples Court: Karl Engert, Gunther 
Nebelung, Oswald Rothaug, Hans Petersen;  
2. Prosecutors of the Peoples Court: Paul Barnickel, Ernst 
Lautz;  
3. Judges of the Special Court: Hermann Cuhorst, Rudolf 
Oeschey, Oswald Rothaug (who had also served as a 
judge of the People’s Court);  
4. Prosecutors of the Special Courts: Günther Joël;  
5. Ministry of Justice: Josef Altstötter, Wilhelm von 
Ammon, Karl Engert, Günther Joël, Herbert Klemm, 
 
169. Id. at 288. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 289. 
173. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 31 (opening statement of Brigadier General 
Telford Taylor) (emphasis added). 
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Wolfgang Mettgenberg, Curt Rothenberger, Franz 
Schlegelberger, Carl Friedrich Otto Westphal.174 
The People’s Court and the Special Courts were established after 
the Nazi takeover of Germany in 1933 as courts parallel to the 
existing German judicial system.175  The People’s Court had 
concurrent jurisdiction over internal subversion and the Special 
Courts had jurisdiction over external threats.176  Both courts were 
staffed by loyal Nazis and were primarily tools for maintaining party 
control.177 
The Ministry of Justice, after a reorganization of the legal system 
after the Nazi takeover, was the central organization of the legal 
system.  The Ministry included all the courts, all the prosecutors, and 
issued all laws and decrees relating to criminal justice.178 
All the defendants were charged with war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.179  Additionally, Altstötter, Cuhorst, Engert, Joël, 
Nebelung, Oeschey, and Rothaug were charged with membership in a 
criminal organization, that is, the leadership ranks of the Nazi Party 
or the SS.180 
None of the defendants were charged with crimes against the peace 
or conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace.181  The most 
prominent of the defendants, and the primary target of the 
prosecution was Franz Schlegelberger, who had been an 
internationally known legal scholar, and one of the pillars of the 
German legal establishment.182  In 1941, after a long and illustrious 
career, he became the acting Minister of Justice, and in that capacity 
took part in some of the most notorious abuses of the German legal 
system under the Nazis.183 
OMGUS 7 gave the defendants the right to counsel of their own 
choice.184  By the time of the NMT trials, there were a group of fifty 
German lawyers with experience in the proceedings who were 
 
174. HELLER, supra note 14, at app. A (listing each defendant, his role, the charges 
against him, the results of his trial, and disposition). 
175. MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 51. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. at 140–41. 
178. See JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 212–17. 
179. HELLER, supra note 14, at app. A. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. See JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 1081, 1087. 
183. Id. at 1082–86. 
184. TAYLOR II, supra note 14, at 30. 
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deemed acceptable to the tribunal and recommended to the 
defendants.185  It was also determined that, although an attorney with 
a significant Nazi past would not be recommended to the defendants, 
such a lawyer might be acceptable to the tribunal if the defendant 
chose someone not on the recommended list.186  Some of the counsel 
did in fact have a history of participation in Nazi activities.187  
The German attorneys, however chosen, were paid by the U.S. 
Army and were provided housing in Nuremberg at no cost.188  They 
were also provided cigarettes, low cost meals, office space, and 
staff.189  In the conditions prevailing in immediate post-war 
Germany, the cigarettes, housing, and food provisions were likely as 
important as the actual monetary payments.190  
In accordance with OMGUS 7, a panel of three judges and an 
alternate were chosen.  Covington Marshall, chief justice of the Ohio 
Supreme Court, was intended to be the presiding judge in the Justice 
Trial, but withdrew from the tribunal for health reasons.191  He was 
replaced by Justin W. Harding who had served as a JAG Officer 
during the war, but had also been a federal judge in the then-territory 
of Alaska from 1929 to 1933.192  Harding was the only former or 
sitting federal judge to serve in any of the NMT trials.  James T. 
Brand, an associate judge of the Supreme Court of Oregon, became 
the new presiding judge.193  Mallory Blair, an associate justice of the 
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, was the third judge.194 
The prosecutors assigned to the case included former Republican 
Congressman Charles LaFollete (lead counsel), Robert King, Alfred 
Wooleyhan, Arnold Buchold, Rudolph Auerbach, and Sadie 
Arbuthnot, one of a number of women attorneys on the various 
 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 46–47. 
187. Id. at 47.  Ultimately, over 200 attorneys represented defendants in the twelve NMT 
trials.  Id. 
188. Id. at 49 & n.156. 
189. Id. at 46, 49. 
190. See id. (explaining the full extent of services and goods rendered by the government 
to defense counsel during the trials). 
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prosecution teams.195  However, Telford Taylor himself gave the 
initial portion of the opening statement.196  
B. Preliminary Motions 
The defendants in the first three NMT trials, that is, the Medical 
Trial, the Milch Trial, and the Justice Trial, all moved to dismiss 
Count I of the indictment relating to conspiracy to commit crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.197  The motion was argued by Egon 
Kuboshok, attorney for Schlegelberger and von Ammon in the Justice 
Trial, on behalf of all the defendants in all three trials.  Telford 
Taylor argued for the prosecution.198  The three tribunals heard the 
motion together and they issued three separate, essentially identical, 
opinions.199  
As previously noted, the conspiracy count had been problematic 
throughout the entire Nuremberg war crime program.  At the London 
Conference, the American and British representatives had argued for 
the inclusion of a conspiracy count and the French and Russian 
delegates had strongly opposed its inclusion in the charges.200  The 
compromise solution was to include a count for conspiracy to commit 
crimes against the peace, but not as to war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.201  Neither ACC 10 nor OMGUS 7 had clarified matters.  
Indeed, ACC 10 specifically included language related to conspiracy 
in Article 2, Section (a), describing crimes against the peace, but not 
in Article 2, Section (b) or Article 2, Section (c), relating to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, whereas OMGUS 7 recognized 
conspiracy as applying to all counts.202 
The decision in the IMT also was not helpful to the prosecution as 
the tribunal gave a narrow interpretation of the conspiracy charge and 
ultimately no defendant was found guilty of conspiracy unless he had 
also been found guilty of crimes against the peace.  The defendants 
argued strenuously that conspiracy was uniquely a feature of Anglo-
 
195. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 14.  Taylor made a point of recruiting women 
lawyers to the trial teams.  Heller notes that ten of ninety-four prosecutors were 
women.  See HELLER, supra note 14, at 34.      
196. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 31. 
197. HELLER, supra note 14, at 276. 
198. See JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 14. 
199. See generally HELLER, supra note 14, at 275–80 (discussing the arguments made by 
both prosecution and defense at trial).  See also 6 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 109–10 (1948). 
200. See supra Section II.A.2. 
201. See London Charter, supra note 113, 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. 
202. ACC 10, supra note 139, at 250; OMGUS 7, supra note 161, at 286. 
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American law and had no counterpart in the civil law system, and 
therefore none in international law.203  
Taylor argued, on behalf of the prosecution, that although 
conspiracy was part of British and American practice, civil law 
systems all contain prohibitions on aiding and abetting or attempting 
to commit a crime.204  Therefore, the issue was not whether persons 
could have participated in the commission of a crime without pulling 
the trigger, as all legal systems recognize closer and farther circles of 
accountability.  The prosecution argued that the inclusion of the 
charge of conspiracy with respect to crimes against the peace resulted 
from the fact that crimes against the peace was a newer offense, 
which had not developed an analog in domestic law unlike the other 
offenses, so there was greater need to spell out that the offense was a 
collective one.205 
Taylor also argued that the London Charter did not intend to limit 
the application of conspiracy law to the other crimes when it included 
it in the definition of a crime against the peace.206  ACC 10, which 
was adopted before the IMT rendered its decision with its narrow 
interpretation of conspiracy law, was intended to give an expansive 
rather than restrictive application of the law.207  
The importance of this issue lies in the use of the conspiracy count 
in the IMT.  Justice Jackson had used the conspiracy count as the 
core of the entire prosecution.  He viewed the conspiracy as having 
commenced in 1933, and he viewed all that followed as part of the 
overall conspiracy.208  Thus, for him and for the American 
prosecutors in general, the conspiracy charge allowed the prosecution 
to explore all participants, events, and aspects of the Third Reich 
from its inception in 1933 to its end in 1945.209 
This broad interpretation of conspiracy in the Justice Trial would 
have allowed the prosecution to build strong cases against defendants 
whose modest involvement in offenses might otherwise have resulted 
in acquittals or light sentences.  It also would have recognized 
liability for each of the defendants for wrongful acts of other 
defendants. 
 
203. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 199, at 105–06. 
204. Id. at 106–07. 
205. Id. at 107–109. 
206. Id. at 106–108. 
207. Id. at 107–09; HELLER, supra note 14, at 278–79.  
208. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 199, at 2. 
209. TAYLOR II, supra note 14, at 74.  
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The three tribunals ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants and 
dismissed the conspiracy counts on the basis that their jurisdiction 
had been established by ACC 10, which only referred to conspiracy 
with respect to crimes against the peace.210 
One of the major implications of the ruling was that the defendants 
could not be found guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity 
for any act committed before September 1, 1939.  However, the 
prosecution could use acts committed before that date to prove 
motive, knowledge, or intent with respect to acts committed after 
September 1, 1939.211 
C. Opening Statements 
The opening statement for the prosecution was delivered by 
Telford Taylor, Charles LaFollette, Alfred Wooleyhan, and Robert 
King.  Taylor’s eloquent opening statement established important 
principles in the trial of this particular group of defendants.  Most 
notably, Taylor made clear that the judges were not being prosecuted 
for being bad judges; indeed, early in his argument, Taylor noted: 
The “trials” they conducted became horrible farces, with 
vestigial remnants of legal procedure which only served to 
mock the hapless victims.  This conduct was dishonor to 
their profession. . . . But the defendants are not now called 
to account for violating constitutional guaranties or 
withholding due process of law.212  
On the contrary, the defendants are accused of 
participating in and being responsible for the killings, 
tortures, and other atrocities that resulted from—and which 
the defendants knew were the inevitable consequences of—
the conduct of their offices as judges, prosecutors and 
ministry officials.213   
Thus, the prosecution’s theory was that the German legal system 
actually ceased to be a legal system, and the judges and prosecutors 
 
210. Id. at 227–28. 
211. As a result of this temporal restriction, several important allegations of crimes 
against humanity, such as euthanasia, compulsory sterilization, and persecution of 
the Catholic Church and the Confessing Church (protestant dissidents) could not be 
fully explored as most of the offenses took place prior to September 1, 1939.  See 
Charles M. LaFollette, Speech Before the Interzonal Conference of Lawyers and 
Justice Officials 18–19 (June 3, 1948). 
212. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 31–32. 
213. Id. at 32.  
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committed crimes through the legal system.  Taylor described in 
detail the degeneration of the German legal system during the Nazi 
era.214  LaFollette then took over the opening and argued at length 
that the tribunal was authorized to make its own interpretation of the 
London Charter and ACC 10 and was free to interpret them more 
broadly than the IMT had.215  In particular, he emphasized that the 
definition of crimes against humanity in ACC 10 was broader than in 
the London Charter, as it did not require that crimes against humanity 
be in association with other crimes.216 
He then noted that the evidence would fall into three categories.  
First, there were offenses that clearly fell within traditional notions of 
war crimes, specifically violations of the Hague Convention of 1907 
and of the Geneva Convention of 1929.217  These offenses included 
two of the major categories in the trial, the Night and Fog Decree,  
the extension of German law to the Incorporated Eastern 
Territories,218 and the deprivation of rights to Poles and Jews in that 
extension.219  Second, was the extensive cooperation by the judiciary 
with the Gestapo and SS in persecution of Germans and non-
Germans alike.220  Third, was the systematic denial of fair trials to 
political and ethnic minorities so that trials would be tantamount to 
murder.221  
King refined these categories to focus specifically on the Law 
Against Poles and Jews, and the Night and Fog program.222  
Wooleyhan laid out the facts in some detail that would be proven as 
to each individual defendant, including descriptions of the most 
notorious cases tried by the various judges.223  Finally, LaFollette 
resumed the podium to discuss questions of evidence and provide 
additional argument concerning the perversion of the legal profession 
under Nazi rule.224  
 
214. See id. at 33–40.  
215. Id. at 62–63. 
216. Id. at 65–66. 
217. Id. at 70. 
218. The Incorporated Eastern Territories were the portion of Poland directly adjacent to 
the German border.  After the invasion of Poland, Germany annexed the territories 
into Germany.  Id. at 119, 594. 
219. Id. at 995, 997, 1003, 1063–64. 
220. Id. at 70–71. 
221. Id. at 71. 
222. Id. at 71–78; see infra Section IV.D. 
223. See JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 78–89. 
224. Id. at 89–100.  
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Kuboshok, Schlegelberger’s attorney, assumed the role of lead 
counsel for all the defendants in the opening statement.225  The other 
defense counsel presented additional arguments with respect to their 
specific clients.226  Kuboshok made two points.  First, in the German 
civil law system, unlike the American or British common law 
systems, judges essentially apply law codes adopted by competent 
authorities.227  Before Hitler, law would have been adopted by the 
Reichstag.228  However, after passage of the Enabling Act of 1933, 
legal authority to legislate passed to Hitler personally.229  Thus, after 
1933, Hitler was the duly constituted supreme legislative authority 
under the Weimar Constitution, which, it should be noted, was never 
abrogated.230  As the German legal tradition dissociated morality and 
law, it was not the role of the judiciary to ignore valid law, no matter 
what the ethical implications were.231 
Second, many of the specific provisions complained of had pre-
Nazi antecedents or were legitimate exercises of power in wartime 
conditions.  Thus, in 1936, law by analogy was intended to introduce 
the flexibility of the common law system into the civil law.232  
There was precedent in Weimar Germany for use of Special Courts 
and People’s Courts. Under the customs and usages of war, many 
acts, which might otherwise be viewed as war crimes, might be 
excused because of military necessity.233  As an example, the 
offensive components of the Night and Fog Decree flowed out of 
military necessity of secrecy in judicial proceedings involving the 
Resistance.  Kuboshok also noted that the judiciary was in a constant 
struggle with the SS, the Gestapo, and the Nazi party for control of 
the judicial process and the maintenance of judicial independence.234  
 
225. Id. at 108. 
226. Id. at 130, 142, 150, 154. 
227. Id. at 108–09. 
228. Id. at 986–87. 
229. Id. at 109–10. 
230. Id. 
231. Id.  As Professor Hermann Jahrreiss, who was called as an expert by the defense on 
the German legal system and constitutional law, testified:  
On the continent of Europe, in the course of four centuries, a 
development has taken place by which law and morality in 
legislative thought are separated sharply; and so as the question of 
morality arises, the lawyer on the continent of Europe says as a 
lawyer, “That has nothing to do with me.” 
 Id. at 257. 
232. Id. at 108–09. 
233. Id. at 120–21. 
234. See id. at 108–26 (statement of Dr. Kubuschok). 
2017 Justice in the Justice Trial at Nuremberg 489 
 
In the remaining arguments, that of Erich Wandschneider, counsel 
for Rothenberg, is of the most interest.  Wandschneider pointed out 
that his client was operating within the climate of a totalitarian 
state.235  In a dictatorship, the average citizen tends to fall into a 
general attitude of passivity because, unlike in a democracy, any 
display of initiative requires a high degree of personal commitment 
and courage.236  It is false, therefore, to look at a course of conduct 
retrospectively without taking into account the pressures and climate 
of a dictatorship.237  Acts, which under normal circumstances might 
be culpable, might be readily excusable under the special 
circumstances of Nazism.238  Thus, Rothenberger’s notorious 
memorandum on the reorganization of the German judiciary on 
National Socialist lines239 was actually an effort to preserve some 
remnants of judicial independence.  The tribunal, therefore, had to 
view the evidence in the case in light of the circumstances with which 
the defendants were faced.240 
D. Testimony 
Arraignment took place on February 17, 1947.241  The trial began 
on March 5, 1947, and ended on October 18, 1947.242  There were 
140 live witnesses, 2,093 exhibits, and 10,964 pages of trial 
transcript.243  
The trial proceeded in the manner set forth in OMGUS 7.  The 
prosecution presented its case first, the defense responded with its 
case, and the prosecution had opportunity for rebuttal.244  The 
 
235. See id. at 144–46. 
236. Id. at 146–47. 
237. Id. at 147–48. 
238. Id. at 146–47. 
239. Rothenberger was an idealistic believer in Nazi ideology.  When he became a senior 
official in the Justice Ministry, he composed a lengthy memorandum urging the 
creation of a “Nazi Conception of Law,” which, among other things, called for the 
complete subordination of the judiciary to Hitler.  See generally J. WALTER JONES, 
The Nazi Conception of Law, in 21 OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS (1939) 
(explaining the Nazi emphasis on unity and strength of leadership, which compelled 
submission of any potentially conflicting political forces in Germany, such as the 
judiciary).  Rothenberger would argue in his testimony that this was his effort to 
preserve judicial independence from the inroads of the Gestapo and SS.  See Sfekas, 
supra note 32, at 215, for a fuller account of Rothenberger’s role in the ultimate 
destruction of judicial independence. 
240. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 146–47. 
241. Id. at 5. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. OMGUS 7, supra note 161, at 289. 
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prosecution had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and had 
to do so by the use of sworn testimony and documents, subject to 
defense cross-examination and confrontation.245  The defense had a 
full opportunity to present its witnesses and documentation, and, in 
fact, the defense presented substantially more testimony and 
documents than did the prosecution.246  All prosecution documents 
had to be provided to the defense prior to introduction and translated 
into German or English.247 
Evidence could be presented by affidavit on either side, subject to 
the opposing side’s requests that the witness be produced for cross-
examination.248  The bulk of testimony in the trial was, in fact, taken 
by affidavit.249  Documents were introduced with an affidavit from 
the document center created by the U.S. Army, certifying the 
authenticity and place of origin of the document.250 
As in the IMT, the prosecution chose to rely heavily on 
documentary proof of wrongdoing, so that the proof of guilt would be 
by the defendants’ own words.251  By contrast, the defense relied 
more heavily on oral testimony, and most of the defendants actually 
testified in the trial.252  The prosecution did very little cross-
examination of defense witnesses.253  
Although there would be substantial evidence introduced with 
respect to a number of issues—such as the failure to prosecute 
civilians who had lynched Allied flyers that were shot down, the 
failure to prosecute members of the Gestapo or SS for abuse of 
POWs or political prisoners, and the persecution of a German 
Catholic priest for officiating at a Polish laborer’s funeral—the heart 
of the case against all of the defendants was their participation in 
either or both the Night and Fog program or actions taken in 
accordance with the Law Against Poles and Jews and other anti-
Semitic laws.254 
 
245. Id. at 288. 
246. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 5. 
247. OMGUS 7, supra note 161, at 287. 
248. TAYLOR II, supra note 14, at 88. 
249. Id. at 88–89. 
250. See JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 5. 
251. See id. 
252. See id. at 115, 125–26, 1212–16. 
253. See id. at 592–93, 731–33, 760–61, 898–902, 925–29. 
254. See id. at 594, 913–14. 
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After the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Poland was 
partitioned between the Germans and Soviets.255  Part of German-
occupied Poland was organized into the “Government General,” 
where military law would apply.256  The parts of Poland contiguous 
to Germany were annexed to Germany and became known as the 
“Incorporated Eastern Territories.”257  The Law Against Poles and 
Jews was issued to provide the legal framework for the 
administration of the Incorporated Eastern Territories.258 
The law had two major themes.  First, in the new regime, Poles 
would be reduced to a docile permanent underclass who would 
support the spread of German settlement in Eastern Europe and, over 
time, be eliminated.259  Thus, the law as to Poles would be applied 
harshly to break the spirit and establish German domination, but 
would not seek to eliminate the Polish population in the short run.260  
Second, the goal was to eliminate the massive Jewish population of 
Poland.261 
The law itself provided substantively that Poles and Jews would be 
subject to the death penalty for any of the following activities:  
1. Any act of violence against a German; 
2. Manifesting any anti-German sentiment by making anti-
German comments or defacing or removing official 
notices or lowering the prestige of the German people.262 
The sentence would be death or imprisonment for any of the 
following:  
1. Any “act of violence against any member of the German 
armed forces,” police, or any agency of the Nazi Party 
whether the victim was German or not; 
2. Causing damages to any installation of the German 
government or the Nazi Party; 
3. Soliciting any person to disobey any decree or 
regulation; 
 
255. Agnieszka Nosowska, 17 September 1939 – The Soviet Invasion of Poland, EUR. 
NETWORK REMEMBRANCE & SOLIDARITY (Sept. 16, 2013, 4:11 PM), 
http://enrs.eu/en/news/882-17-september-1939-the-soviet-invasion-of-poland. 
256. See JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 119, 615–17. 
257. Id. at 119. 
258. HELLER, supra note 14, at 225. 
259. See JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 614–15, 1065. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 1065. 
262. Id. at 616. 
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4. Conspiring with or aiding or abetting anyone in the 
violation of this decree; 
5. Possession of any weapon; 
6. Committing any other act contrary to “fundamental 
principles of German criminal law” or contrary to the 
interest of the German state.263 
The death penalty was made mandatory for any act for which death 
was the only penalty.264  A schedule of prison terms ranging from 
three months to ten years was prescribed when imprisonment was an 
option.265  However, “in cases where the law does not provide for the 
death sentence, [it shall] be imposed, if the committed action testifies 
to an exceptionally vicious character or if for other reasons the crime 
is a very serious one.”266  The minimum penalties could not be 
reduced unless the crimes were committed against a fellow Pole or 
Jew.267  The law also changed the procedures available to a Polish or 
Jewish defendant: 
1. The cases would be brought before the Special Courts in 
most cases. 
2. All sentences, including the death penalty, would be 
carried out without delay. 
3. The prosecutor could appeal a decision, but the 
defendant had no right to appeal. 
4. Poles and Jews had no right to lodge a criminal 
complaint. 
5. Poles and Jews had no right to ask for recusal for bias of 
a German judge. 
6. Poles and Jews could not be sworn in as 
witnesses.  However, even if unsworn, they could be 
prosecuted for perjury or false statements.268 
7. Although proceedings would be conducted in 
accordance with the German Law of Civil Procedure, 
the court was free to depart from the established rules 
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when appropriate for the rapid and efficient conduct of 
proceedings.269 
The Law allowed the governor of the Incorporated Eastern 
Territories to impose martial law and to try Poles and Jews before 
civilian courts-martial or to defer trial indefinitely and to refer the 
case directly to the Gestapo.270 
Finally, Poles and Jews were forbidden to file civil cases.271  In 
January 1942, a subsequent decree was issued over Schlegelberger’s 
signature making this law retroactive.272  
On July 1, 1943, a new decree was issued which deprived Jews of 
any right to a trial at all and turned any Jew accused of a crime over 
to the police for processing.273  The Jew’s property would be 
confiscated upon his death.  Thus, the Law Against Poles and Jews 
would no longer apply to Jews.274  This change in the law reflected 
the official adoption of the so-called Final Solution, that is, the 
systematic murder of the entire Jewish population in the occupied 
territories of Europe.275 
By 1941, resistance movements had sprung up in a number of 
occupied countries, and the German Army was struggling to find a 
solution to the growing problem of maintaining control of the 
occupied territories.276  Hitler instructed the German Army to 
implement a program whereby suspected resistors would disappear 
into the “Night and Fog.”277 
The Night and Fog Decree was issued on December 7, 1941, at 
Hitler’s direction by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, who was the 
Chief of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.278  Keitel himself 
would be tried by the IMT and found guilty of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, crimes against the peace, and conspiring to commit 
crimes against the peace.  He would be executed in 1946.279 
The decree provided that in circumstances in which the trial of a 
member of the resistance could not be dealt with within one week of 
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arrest, the resistor would be transferred to Germany for trial.280  The 
defendant’s family and acquaintances would not be informed of his 
or her fate, would not be allowed contact or correspondence with the 
person, and would not be informed of his or her location.281  If the 
person died, either of natural causes or execution, the family 
members would not be informed.282  If the defendant wrote a will or a 
farewell letter, the document would not be delivered until the war’s 
end.283  As no foreign witnesses would be allowed to testify in court 
in order to preserve secrecy, the defendant essentially had no ability 
to call witnesses on his own behalf.284  The defendant would have the 
right to counsel in capital cases (the great majority of cases), but the 
choice of counsel would be made by the court with permission of the 
prosecutor.285  The proceedings would be conducted in German with 
restrictions on the availability of interpreters.286  The decree was 
made applicable in all cases involving:  
1. Assault with intent to kill[;] 
2. Espionage[;] 
3. Sabotage[;] 
4. Communist activity[;] 
5. Crimes liable to create disorder[;] 
6. Favoring of the enemy [by] the following means: 
a. Smuggling people into a country[;] 
b. The attempt to enlist in an enemy army[;] 
c. Support of members of an enemy army 
(parachutist; etc.)[;] [or] 
7. Illegal possession of arms.287 
 
Although the decree was applicable to all the occupied territories, it 
in fact was primarily directed at the west European occupied 
countries (i.e., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and 
Norway) except for Denmark.288 
The case against Schlegelberger focused on his role in drafting the 
Law Against Poles and Jews and on his role in implementing the 
 
280. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 779. 
281. Id. at 75. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 77–78. 
284. See id. 
285. Id. at 78, 785. 
286. See id. at 640. 
287. Id. at 778–79. 
288. See id. at 785. 
2017 Justice in the Justice Trial at Nuremberg 495 
 
Night and Fog Decree and keeping it in the judiciary rather than 
leaving it with the Wehrmacht (the German Army), where it more 
likely should have been kept.289  The testimony indicated that the 
Wehrmacht was reluctant to participate in the program because of 
doubts as to its legality.290 
The prosecution introduced Schlegelberger’s draft of the Law 
Against Poles and Jews, which showed him to have played a pivotal 
role in producing that policy and overseeing its implementation.291  
The prosecution produced many documents signed by Schlegelberger 
indicating his complicity in the overall degradation of German justice 
in the Nazi period.292  Two particularly damaging pieces of evidence 
were a memo removing two notaries from office for having bought 
postcards from a Jewish street vendor,293 and his proposal that Jews 
who were in mixed marriages not be deported to the East if they 
agreed to be sterilized.294  The defense, for its part, produced 
Schlegelberger in his own defense.  He noted that during the entire 
period of Nazi rule, the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary were in a 
constant struggle against the SS, Gestapo, and the Nazi Party for 
control of the judicial process.295  Schlegelberger argued that much of 
what he did therefore actually served to protect judicial independence 
and protect defendants.296  He argued that even the Law Against 
Poles and Jews offered some limited procedural rights to the victims 
and was therefore better than the laws which might have been 
proposed by the SS, Gestapo, or the Nazi Party.297 
He also testified that he agreed to take on the Night and Fog 
program because the alternative, given the Werhmacht’s reluctance, 
would have been to have turned over the defendants to the Gestapo or 
SS for immediate disposition without trial.298  Schlegelberger also 
noted that many of the harsh measures adopted in the Law Against 
Poles and Jews were intended to stave off harsher measures.299  He 
also pointed out that he was in fact replaced by Thierack, a Nazi 
zealot, as Minister of Justice after his resignation in 1942, and that all 
 
289. See id. at 811–15. 
290. See id. at 806–07.  
291. Id. at 615–20. 
292. See id. at 598–606, 611–20. 
293. Id. at 363–65. 
294. Id. at 648–49. 
295. See id. at 292–93. 
296. See id. at 808–09. 
297. See id. at 809–10. 
298. See id. at 808–09. 
299. See id. at 811–13. 
496 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
semblance of judicial independence and adherence to legal norms 
disappeared after his departure.300   
The prosecution introduced testimony that, in addition to 
Schlegelberger, Klemm, Rothenberger, Lautz, Mettgenberg, von 
Ammon and Joël were all involved in the Night and Fog program.301  
Additionally, there was substantial evidence against Rothaug, Lautz, 
and Joël for actions under the Law Against Poles and Jews.302 
Of the greatest interest was the testimony against Rothaug and 
Oeschey, two People’s Court judges, which consisted of case reports 
and testimony of multiple trials in which Poles and Jews had been 
deprived of all semblance of a fair trial, and had ultimately been 
found guilty and executed.303  Many of the best-known incidents of 
the trials occurred in their courtrooms,304 most notably with evidence 
of the Katzenberger-Seiler case.305 
1. The Katzenberger-Seiler Case 
Leo Katzenberger was a 68-year-old Jewish man, a leader in the 
Jewish community, who had befriended Irene Seiler, the daughter of 
a tenant of his.306  They had maintained a friendly relationship for 
years and on one occasion she was seen to have sat on his lap.307  
Katzenberger was charged with violating the Nuremberg race laws, 
which prohibited sexual relations between Jews and non-Jewish 
Germans.308  The evidence showed that Rothaug prejudged the case 
and privately disclosed before the trial that Katzenberger would be 
found guilty and would receive the death penalty, even though there 
was no evidence that he had in fact had sexual relations with 
Seiler.309 
Because Seiler denied any sexual contact with Katzenberger, 
Rothaug decided that she would be tried for perjury in the same trial 
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as Katzenberger.310  Thus, her denial was discredited. The minimum 
penalty for violation of the Nuremberg laws was imprisonment for up 
to one year or a fine or both.311  Rothaug noted, however, that the 
alleged offenses occurred at night.312  Using law by analogy, he 
concluded that the sexual relationship was analogous to a violation of 
the wartime blackout restrictions, for which the death penalty was 
available.313  Rothaug sentenced Katzenberger to death and Seiler to 
two years’ imprisonment.314 
2. The Kaminska-Wdowen Case315 
Oeschey presided over the Kaminska-Wdowen Case.316  Sophie 
Kaminska was a 36-year-old Polish woman who was the mother of 
three children.317  Her husband was killed in the German attack on 
Poland in September 1939.318  Thereafter she came to Germany to 
work on a German farm.319  Wasyl Wdowen was a 20-year-old 
Ukrainian farm worker who resided in Poland at the time of the 
German invasion.320  Kaminska and Wdowen developed a romantic 
attachment and had a child together while working on the farm.321  At 
some point a dispute broke out between Kaminska and the German 
farmer over compensation.322  Wdowen joined the dispute in support 
of Kaminska and reportedly shoved the farmer.323  A German soldier 
on leave heard the commotion and joined the dispute.324  He later 
gave a statement that Kaminska slapped him and he slapped her 
back.325  She was also alleged to have picked up a hoe and threatened 
him.326  The soldier then pulled out a bayonet and ordered Kaminska 
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and Wdowen to leave.327  As the soldier left on his bicycle to call the 
police, Kaminska threw a stone at him.328  
Kaminska’s account differed in that she testified that the soldier 
slapped her first.329  The soldier’s account came in a statement he 
gave at the police station.330  As he was missing in action in North 
Africa, he did not testify.331  Kaminska gave unsworn testimony, in 
accordance with the law.332  The court credited the soldier’s 
testimony and discredited hers.333  When the police came to arrest 
her, she resisted arrest.334  Wdowen tried to help her, but was ordered 
to stay away.335  He followed her to the jail and took her hands as she 
was being put into jail.336 
Kaminska was convicted of using a knife or a thrusting weapon 
against a German soldier (based on her throwing a stone at him as he 
rode off).337  Using the doctrine of decision by analogy, Oeschey 
concluded that the purpose of throwing the stone was to injure the 
soldier.338  If he had been hit by the stone he might have died.339  As a 
soldier he was essential to the German war effort.340  Therefore the 
stone must be considered to be the equivalent of a knife, and she was 
therefore guilty of a serious violent crime.341  By invoking the Law 
Against Poles and Jews, Oeschey imposed a death sentence on 
Kaminska.342 
Oeschey found Wdowen guilty of insulting German honor by 
pushing the German farmer.343  In addition, by holding Kaminska’s 
hands while a police official tried to put her in jail, he offered 
forceful resistance to an official in performance of his official duty.344  
As these crimes were only possible because the war called most able-
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wartime conditions to commit his crimes.345  As a result, Oeschey 
also sentenced him to death.346 
3. The Stefanowicz-Lenczewski Case 
In another case, typical of many cited in the opinion, two Polish 
laborers, Paul Stefanowicz, age twenty, and Franz Lenczewski, age 
eighteen, left their workplaces to which they were committed and 
attempted to cross the border into Switzerland.347  They were caught 
by border control.348  The court noted that although it could not be 
proven that they intended to join the Polish army (indeed the court 
noted that both men appeared to be “effeminate”): “Nevertheless, as 
Poles, both of them have harmed the interests of the German Reich 
by their conduct.  For they were assigned to work in the Reich, and in 
total warfare any loss in this regard harms the interests of the 
Reich.”349  Under the Law Against Poles and Jews, Stefanowicz was 
sentenced to death and Lenczewski to eight years’ imprisonment.350  
It should be noted that although neither had ever been a German 
citizen, they were both charged with treason, thereby vesting the 
People’s Court with jurisdiction.351  The prosecutor in this case was 
defendant Lautz.352 
4. The Durka and Struss Cases 
An additional case concerned seventeen and eighteen-year-old 
Polish girls who worked in a munitions factory.353  Both were 
accused of setting a fire at the factory, and both were alleged to have 
confessed.354  Their trial was held the same day as the arrest and the 
fire.355  Their attorney was given two hours’ notice of the trial, and 
his request for postponement was denied.356  One of the girls, who 
reportedly confessed, recanted her confession at the trial.357  Both 
were found guilty and were sentenced to death by the presiding 
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judge, defendant Rothaug.358  They were executed four days after the 
trial.359  In each of these cases, the trappings of a trial were present, 
but the reality of a fair trial was not. 
E. Opinion 
Woe to those who make unjust laws, to those who issue 
oppressive decrees, to deprive the poor of their rights and 
withhold justice from the oppressed of my people.360 
On December 3–4, 1947, the tribunal issued a thorough and 
comprehensive opinion, running to 223 pages.361  The opinion began 
with a review of its jurisdiction and authority to proceed under the 
London Charter, ACC 10 and OMGUS 7.362  The tribunal then went 
on to a detailed analysis of the crimes charged in the indictment, 
particularly focusing on Count III, crimes against humanity.363 
As has been noted, the charge of crimes against humanity was first 
specifically identified in the London Charter and was modified by the 
requirement that such an offense be in association with some of the 
other crimes identified in the London Charter, to wit, crimes against 
the peace and war crimes.364  Despite the opinion of the IMT, which 
found a number of defendants guilty of crimes against humanity, the 
difference in text between the definition of crimes against humanity 
in the London Charter and ACC 10 left many questions about the 
application of the charges.  The tribunal set about to answer these 
questions.  
First, the tribunal clearly distinguished between a war crime and a 
crime against humanity and, in doing so, established a definition used 
in subsequent cases of international law.  The tribunal noted that a 
war crime was an offense committed during war time against the 
population of a belligerent enemy power.365  The specific type of 
offense constituting a war crime was set forth in treaties, such as the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, as well as by the traditional customs 
and usages of war.366  A war crime could be committed against a 
single person.367 
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The defendants had argued that an offense committed against 
civilians in the Incorporated Eastern Territories could not be a war 
crime because they were now part of Germany.368  The tribunal 
concluded that because there were Polish armies still in the field 
fighting,369 and a Polish government in exile had existed throughout 
the war, the administrative decision to incorporate Polish land into 
the German Reich did not change any part of pre-war Poland into 
German territory.370  
Crimes against humanity, particularly as defined in ACC 10, served 
as a complement to war crimes.  Under ACC 10, Section 2(b) a crime 
against humanity was an offense against any civilian population, not 
only that of a belligerent power.371  Thus, German officials could be 
guilty of a crime against humanity even if the offense were against 
German civilians or on German soil. 
The tribunal recognized that not all offenses against German 
civilians would constitute crimes against humanity or a crime under 
international law.372  For example, the court concluded that the 
imposition of what appeared to be excessively harsh penalties on 
certain categories of offenders such as habitual criminals or violators 
of laws concerning hoarding or black markets were not crimes 
against humanity, as long as the prosecution or penalty was not based 
on racial, religious, or prohibited discrimination.373  Similarly, the 
references in ACC 10 to offenses “against any civilian population” 
had to be interpreted to mean that an offense against an individual, no 
matter how serious, would not be a crime against humanity.374  The 
tribunal therefore came to the following interpretation: 
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We hold that crimes against humanity as defined in C.C. 
Law 10 must be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases 
of atrocity or persecution whether committed by private 
individuals or by governmental authority.  As we construe 
it, that section provides for punishment of crimes committed 
against German nationals only where there is proof of 
conscious participation in systematic government organized 
or approved procedures amounting to atrocities and offenses 
of the kind specified in the act and committed against 
populations or amounting to persecutions on political, racial 
or religious grounds.375  
Although the opinion, in deciding the fate of individual 
defendants—particularly the judges on trial—relied heavily on clear 
incidents of miscarriages of justice, the opinion made clear that the 
specific cases were being cited to demonstrate a pattern of 
wrongdoing against populations, rather than constituting offenses in 
their own right.376  
The defendants in all of the NMT cases argued that the charge of 
crimes against humanity was an ex-post facto law since the crime 
was first officially identified in the London Charter.377  All the 
tribunals concluded that, as their jurisdiction was established by the 
London Charter and ACC 10, they accepted the inclusion of crimes 
against humanity as binding.378 
This tribunal, however, was the only one to consider whether the 
offenses also violated fundamental justice as an ex-post facto law.379 
The tribunal first noted that, unlike legislation in the United States 
or other constitutional countries, there was no constitutional limit or 
superior law by which to challenge the London Charter or ACC 10.380  
Thus, there was no basis for a legal challenge to the offense. 
However, the tribunal concluded that the ex-post facto rule was 
based on notions of justice and that there was no injustice in the 
application of ACC 10.381  First, the ex-post facto principle is 
primarily applied to statutory provisions, but is generally not applied 
in decisions under the common law, that is, decisions which typically 
deal with novel situations.382  International law is comparable to the 
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common law in that it grows by accretion.383  Thus, a rigid 
application of the ex-post facto principle would 
“strangle . . . [common international] law at birth.”384  
 More to the point, the tribunal noted that: 
As a principle of justice and fair play, the rule in question 
will be given full effect.  As applied in the field of 
international law that principle requires proof before 
conviction that the accused knew or should have known 
that in matters of international concern he was guilty of 
participation in a nationally organized system of injustice 
and persecution shocking to the moral sense of mankind, 
and that he knew or should have known that he would be 
subject to punishment if caught.385  
The opinion then noted that, as part of the Versailles Peace 
Conference, the Commission on Responsibility of Authors of the War 
had specifically stated that persons who had violated “the laws and 
customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal 
prosecution.”386  
The opinion also recounted a number of prior incidents in which 
countries had intervened with Ottoman Turkey to protect its Christian 
minorities, with Russia and Romania on behalf of their Jewish 
minorities, and with Spain on behalf of the Cuban population.387  
Finally, and ironically, Hitler himself had justified his intervention in 
Czechoslovakian internal affairs on behalf of the allegedly persecuted 
Sudeten Germans, which was the incident triggering the notorious 
Munich agreement dismembering Czechoslovakia.388  
Thus, the defendants had to have known that if they had engaged in 
massive acts of injustice, even against their own people in wartime, 
they might very well be found criminally liable.  There was no 
unfairness or injustice in trying the defendants for crimes against 
humanity.389  
The tribunal disposed of several other defenses of the defendants.  
First, the tribunal concluded that the defendants were charged with 
using German law as an instrument for the commission of war crimes 
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and crimes against humanity, and as ACC 10 specifically rejected 
compliance with domestic law as a defense, the defendants could not 
use compliance with German law in defense.390 
Additionally, the tribunal noted that the doctrine of judicial 
immunity, applicable in American courts, would not be available to 
the German judges as the immunity was only available to judicial 
officials who were acting independently.391  Judicial independence 
had ceased to exist in Germany.392    
Although there was a great deal of testimony on a number of 
issues, the opinion focused on two general categories of offense: (1) 
acts associated with the Night and Fog Decree and (2) acts of racial 
persecution, particularly with the Law Against Poles and Jews.393  
The tribunal’s task with respect to the Night and Fog Decree was 
simplified by the decision in the IMT, which found field marshals 
Keitel and Jodl guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for 
their role in the Night and Fog program.394  There was, therefore, 
binding precedent for finding that the Night and Fog program could 
not be justified on the basis of military necessity.  Indeed, the tribunal 
noted that, in a number of cases, the victims in the Night and Fog 
cases were acquitted or given light sentences as posing little threat, 
yet they were sent to concentration camps anyway, rather than being 
sent home where they could reveal the nature of the program.395 
The tribunal noted that the program violated the laws of war, in 
particular, Article 5 of the Hague Convention pertaining to the 
treatment of prisoners of war; Article 23 pertaining to maintaining the 
civilian courts of the occupied countries; Article 43 pertaining to 
maintaining order and enforcing the law; and most importantly, 
Article 46 pertaining to protection of family honor and rights and 
protecting the lives and property rights, religious practices, and 
convictions of persons in occupied territories.396 
 An important part of the decision was the tribunal’s conclusion that 
the secrecy of the Night and Fog program was intended to terrorize 
and intimidate families of the victims as well as members of the 
occupied population—whether they were engaged in resistance 
activities or not—thereby violating international law.397  Thus, 
 
390. Id. at 984.  
391. Id. at 1024–25. 
392. Id. 
393. See id. at 1031–81. 
394. Id. at 1060. 
395. Id. at 1058. 
396. Id. at 1061. 
397. Id. at 1058. 
2017 Justice in the Justice Trial at Nuremberg 505 
 
intentional infliction of emotional harm to third parties could 
constitute a crime.398 
The tribunal also addressed the nature of the Night and Fog court 
proceedings as well.  Had the trials provided under the Night and Fog 
program been conducted fairly, the programs likely still would have 
been viewed as a war crime or a crime against humanity, but the 
crimes would have been highly mitigated.  However, as the tribunal 
noted: 
The trials of the accused NN persons did not approach 
even a semblance of fair trial or justice.  The accused NN 
persons were arrested and secretly transported to Germany 
and other countries for trial.  They were held 
incommunicado.  In many instances they were denied the 
right to introduce evidence, to be confronted by witnesses 
against them, or to present witnesses in their own behalf.  
They were tried secretly and denied the right of counsel of 
their own choice, and occasionally denied the aid of any 
counsel.  No indictment was served in many instances and 
the accused learned only a few moments before the trial of 
the nature of the alleged crime for which he was to be tried.  
The entire proceedings from beginning to end were secret 
and no public record was allowed to be made of them.399  
It is clear that the systematic denial of these rudiments of a fair 
trial, whether under common law, civil law, or courts martial to 
persons in occupied countries could itself constitute a war crime and 
a crime against humanity.400  Each of the defendants indicted for 
participation in the Night and Fog program, whether as drafters of the 
decree, as judges or as prosecutors, was found guilty of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.401 
The second broad category of offense discussed in the opinion was 
racial persecution, particularly of Poles and Jews.  A majority of the 
specific cases cited were of Poles, rather than Jews, because Jews 
were effectively barred from the court system in early 1943, as the 
Final Solution was implemented.402  
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This portion of the opinion focused on the impact of the Law 
Against Poles and Jews and on the trials of Polish citizens for high 
treason against Germany.  Schlegelberger and others drafted the Law 
Against Poles and Jews to extend German law, including its racial 
laws, to the newly annexed Polish land.403  As was previously noted, 
this law dramatically reduced the rights of Poles and Jews in the legal 
system and, coupled with provisions of German law, such as law by 
analogy, made it impossible for a Pole or Jew even to know what 
conduct of his or hers might constitute a crime under the new German 
laws.404 
Schlegelberger, as primary draftsman, and Oeschey and Rothaug, 
as judges applying the law, were the principal targets of this portion 
of the case.  Although the tribunal reviewed individual acts of cruelty 
and injustice committed by the various defendants in great detail, the 
defendants were not found guilty because of the conduct of any 
particular trial.405  Rather, the tribunal found that the overall policy of 
the government was the extermination of Jews and Poles from 
Germany and throughout Europe.  The defendants took part in this 
policy of extermination by various actions, including the enactment 
of laws for the persecution and extermination of Poles and Jews, for 
attempting to enforce those laws, and for presiding over the 
adjudication of alleged violations of such laws, by means of sham 
trials.406 
The policy of extermination constituted a war crime despite the 
purported annexation of portions of Poland because, as previously 
noted, a Polish government in exile was still operating and a Polish 
army was still in the field resisting Germany.407  The tribunal 
concluded that the annexation should not be recognized, and that it 
would be improper to allow a country to evade responsibility for war 
crimes by the simple expedient of annexing occupied territories.408  
Therefore, the Law Against Poles and Jews and actions taken under it 
could constitute war crimes.  Additionally, because German policy 
consisted of atrocities and persecutions by the German government 
against racial and religious minorities, the law would in any event 
constitute a crime against humanity.409 
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The opinion’s discussion of the charges against the defendants 
Oeschey and Rothaug are of particular interest.  The tribunal 
concluded that the trials conducted by Oeschey and Rothaug were 
conducted in a manner so failing to meet even minimal levels of due 
process or fairness so as not to be trials at all.410  The tribunal 
recognized the recently coined term, “genocide,” which is the 
deliberate murder of members of a defined group in order to 
eliminate the group’s existence.411  As the only purpose of these trials 
was the judicial murder of Jews and Poles in accordance with the 
overall government policy, Rothaug was one of the first persons in 
history found guilty of genocide, a subset of crimes against 
humanity.412 
The tribunal also considered a bizarre feature of German law 
during the war.  Polish laborers from the annexed areas were brought 
into Germany, whether voluntarily or involuntarily to work on 
German farms.413  On a number of occasions, workers fled their 
farms to escape to Switzerland.414  These escaped farm hands were 
captured, tried for high treason against Germany, and sentenced to 
death even though they had no allegiance to Germany.415  Between 
150–200 Polish workers were prosecuted under this theory.416  The 
tribunal found this program to be a crime against humanity and a war 
crime because the finding of guilt for treason required that the death 
penalty be imposed.417 
As with the Night and Fog portion of the opinion, the opinion 
describes the manner in which Oeschey and Rothaug failed to meet 
minimum standards of justice in their courts.  Specifically, they 
refused to permit the Poles and Jews who were tried before them to 
present witnesses on their own behalf.418  They denied defense 
counsel time to prepare a defense or even to be present.419  They were 
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neither fair nor impartial.420  Indeed, in a number of cases, these 
judges met with prosecutors to advise them on how to present their 
cases or to come to agreement on the punishment before the trial was 
even held.421  Both indicated from the bench that they would not 
believe the testimony of a Jewish or Polish witness.422  One 
conclusion of this opinion is that the systematic denial of a fair trial 
could constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity.  
F. Verdict and Sentences 
Schlegelberger was found guilty of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes arising out of his involvement with the Night and Fog 
Decree and the Law Against Poles and Jews.423  The tribunal took 
seriously Schlegelberger’s argument that the judiciary was under 
constant challenge from the SS, the Nazi Party, and the Gestapo, and 
that his actions were intended to ward off even harsher actions, and 
that anyone who would have followed him would have been 
worse.424  The tribunal acknowledged that his actual successor, 
Thierack, was in fact worse,425 and that Schlegelberger may have 
mitigated some measures.426  Even so, the tribunal noted that in 
attempting to hold off the SS and Gestapo, Schlegelberger and the 
other defendants had created a system of which more extreme 
successors would take advantage.427  The Court concluded that: 
Schlegelberger is a tragic character.  He loved the life of an 
intellect, the work of the scholar.  We believe that he 
loathed the evil that he did, but he sold that intellect and that 
scholarship to Hitler for a mess of political pottage and for 
the vain hope of personal security.428  
Schlegelberger was sentenced to life imprisonment.429 
 
420. See id. at 1046–47 (“The trials of the accused . . . persons did not approach even a 
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In addition to Schlegelberger, von Ammon, Klemm, Lautz, 
Mettgenberg, and Rothenberger were convicted of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.430  Joël and Oeschey were convicted of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and membership in a criminal 
organization.431  Rothaug was convicted of crimes against humanity, 
but was acquitted of war crimes.432  Altstötter was convicted of 
membership in a criminal organization, but was acquitted of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.433  Barnickel, Cuhorst, 
Nebelung, and Petersen were acquitted.434  Westphal died before trial, 
and Engert was granted a mistrial due to illness.435  In addition to 
Schlegelberger, Klemm, Oeschey, and Rothaug received life 
sentences, the rest received sentences from five to ten years in 
length.436 
One group of verdicts is of particular interest.  Seven of the 
defendants were tried for offenses committed in their capacity as 
judges.437  A mistrial was declared in Engert’s case, and the tribunal 
acquitted Nebelung and Petersen with no explanation or review of 
evidence.438 
The opinion described at great length its conclusion with respect to 
Oeschey, Rothaug and Cuhorst.  In each case the tribunal described 
the actions of the defendants in harsh terms. As an example, Cuhorst 
is described as: “a fanatical Nazi and a ruthless judge.  There is also 
much evidence as to the arbitrary, unfair, and unjudicial manner in 
which he conducted his trials.”439  However, the tribunal also noted 
that some of the records of his cases had been destroyed in an air 
raid, with the result that:  
[T]his Tribunal does not consider that it can say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of inflicting 
the punishments which he imposed on racial grounds or that 
it can say beyond a reasonable doubt that he used the 
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discriminatory provisions of the decree against Poles and 
Jews to the prejudice of the Poles whom he tried.440  
Thus, although Cuhorst may have been an agent of injustice, it had 
not been proved that he committed a crime against humanity, one 
element of which was atrocity or persecution based on racial, 
religious, or political grounds.441  There was no such problem of 
proof with respect to Oeschey and Rothaug.  Their convictions were 
based on many examples of sham trials and harsh sentences given to 
defendants specifically because they were Jews or Poles.442  
G. Aftermath 
The story does not end with the imposition of sentence.  Both 
during and after the twelve Nuremberg Military Tribunals, pressure 
to stop the trials or mitigate the sentences developed in Germany and 
in the United States.  The opposition in the United States was led by a 
group of conservative Republican Senators, notably Senators Joseph 
McCarthy and Robert Taft.443 
In Germany, a number of groups sought the release of the NMT 
defendants, including church groups and the Adenauer government of 
the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany.444  While the United 
States was negotiating for German accession to the NATO alliance, 
and for German support in the Cold War, the High Commissioner for 
Germany, John McCloy, set in motion processes which resulted in 
the release of all the NMT defendants, including all of the Justice 
Trial defendants.445  Schlegelberger received a medical release in 
1951.446  The last Justice Trial defendants to be released were 
Oeschey in 1955 and Rothaug in 1956.447 
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V. CONCLUSION 
I myself was a criminal judge.  One single 
murder . . . occupied our time for 2 to 3 weeks, and it 
was a terrible thing.  Two murders by one person—that 
was horrifying.  If someone had eight to ten murders on 
his conscience, then he was described as a mass 
murderer in the press of Europe, and people asked 
themselves whether this was something that could be 
handled by means of the penal code at all. 
When, last year, in the courtroom of the big trial I 
listened to the witness, Hoess, of Auschwitz, when he 
answered the question of the prosecutor as to how many 
people he had killed . . . he answered he didn’t remember 
exactly whether two and a half or three million.  At that 
time it was quite obvious to me that . . . this had anything 
to do anymore with legal considerations because, Mr. 
Prosecutor, no matter what a state regulates concerning 
the question of review of a law the state has to think of 
normal conditions.  These occurrences and matters 
cannot be measured by any order of the world at all.448 
[T]he arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward 
justice.449 
In the introduction to this article, three questions were posed.  Was 
the trial procedurally fair?  Was it substantively fair?  Was justice 
done? 
A. Was the Trial Procedurally Fair? 
The opinion in the trial provides the appropriate measure of its 
fairness.  In discussing the Night and Fog program in particular, the 
tribunal set forth a number of criteria defining a fair trial under 
international law. 
A fair trial would have to be public, with a record of proceedings.  
The defendants could not be held incommunicado.  They would be 
entitled to counsel of their own choice.  They would receive adequate 
notice of the charges against them with sufficient time to prepare for 
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their case.  They must have an opportunity to confront witnesses 
against them and to present witnesses and documents on their own 
behalf.  There must be interpreters available for those who cannot 
understand the language or the proceedings.  The finder of fact and 
law had to be fair and impartial.450  
The Nuremberg Trials, in general, and the Justice Trial, in 
particular, met this international standard well.  The defendants not 
only had counsel of their own choosing, but unlike American 
practice, pre-Gideon, the United States government paid for their 
counsel.451  They received copies of the indictments long before the 
trial and were given copies of all documents the prosecution intended 
to introduce before their introduction.452  The defendants were 
allowed to present witnesses on their own behalf and to present 
exhibits.453  Indeed, the defense submitted more witnesses and 
exhibits than did the prosecution.454  Guilt had to be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt.455 
Given the hybrid nature and logistical problems of the proceedings, 
much of the evidence was presented by affidavit, rather than by live 
witnesses.456  However, the defense had the ability to require the 
prosecution to call any person whose affidavit the prosecution had 
produced for purposes of cross-examination.457  The defense also 
benefitted from the availability of simultaneous interpreters.458  As 
noted above, Justice Jackson offered as a rule of thumb for 
determining the fairness of a proceeding that the result could be the 
acquittal of defendants.459  In the Justice Trial, the tribunal granted 
the defense motion striking the conspiracy count.460  It also acquitted 
four of the defendants.461 Most significantly, it acquitted Cuhorst.462  
Although it found that he was a terrible judge, it could not find him 
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge of war crimes because 
it had not been proved that he had discriminated against Poles and 
Jews on the basis of race.463 
If this trial is said to have established a universal standard of 
procedural fairness, it is of note that many of the protections afforded 
the defendants, such as provision of counsel at public expense, or full 
discovery, would not be constitutionally mandated under American 
law for years to come.  Additionally, although the American legal 
system was well-regarded at this time, the standard of justice for 
African Americans, particularly in the South, did not meet the 
standard set forth by the Justice Trial tribunal.464 
On the other hand, other elements of American and British practice 
were not recognized as universally binding.  For example, the trials 
made no use of a lay jury.465  Hearsay in the form of affidavits was 
easily admitted, and concomitantly the confrontation of witnesses 
was not required.466  However, the defendants were allowed to 
challenge affidavits and to require that the preparer of the affidavit 
make the witness available for cross-examination and 
confrontation.467  On balance, it appears that the trial was conducted 
fairly. 
B. Was the Trial Substantively Fair? 
This is a more difficult question than procedural fairness.  The 
entire Nuremberg project has been criticized from its inception for 
being “victors’ justice” and for trying the defendants ex-post facto.468 
In a sense, most international criminal trials could be viewed as 
victors’ justice.  The trials generally can only take place when the 
suspect is in custody, and witnesses and documentation are available.  
In the case of high government officials or warlords, these conditions 
will only occur after military defeat or the overthrow of a 
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government.469  Thus, there was no prospect for trial of Nazi leaders 
until the Allies had defeated Germany, captured its leaders and seized 
German archives.  To this extent, the charge of victors’ justice is of 
no weight.  The Nuremberg project could have constituted victors’ 
justice if the trials had been show trials or if, as the British suggested 
at the London Conference,470 the Allies had simply shot the Nazi 
leaders.  It should be noted that in some circumstances in post-war 
Europe, victors’ justice in fact occurred.  Mussolini and other Fascist 
leaders were summarily executed by resistance forces.471  Female 
collaborators in France and Italy were publicly humiliated.472  
German populations were summarily expelled from Czechoslovakia 
for collaboration.473  
Some critics have suggested that the trial should have included at 
least one German judge or perhaps a judge from a neutral country.474  
Given the failure of the Leipzig trials after World War I475 and the 
very discrediting of the German judiciary which led to the convening 
of the Justice Trial, it would have been profoundly inappropriate to 
have had German judges.  Similarly, there were few neutrals in 
World War II.  The only European neutrals were Spain and Portugal, 
both with authoritarian governments;476 Sweden, which had 
cooperated with the Germans in the military occupation of Norway 
and sold iron and weapons to Germany;477 Ireland, whose intense 
anti-British feelings led it to refuse all cooperation with the Allies;478 
and Switzerland, which despite Allied pressure sold war materials to 
the Germans until late in the war.479  
More importantly, none of these countries, by their failure to have 
entered the struggle against Nazism and by their frequent 
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collaboration with the German war effort, had earned the moral 
stature to participate in the trials.480  It is not clear that participation 
by neutral governments would have been acceptable to any of the 
belligerent powers or that their participation would in any way have 
contributed to the real or perceived justice of the proceedings. 
The ex-post facto charge is of greater moment.  None of the 
defendants in the Justice Trial were charged with crimes against the 
peace, and the charge of conspiracy to commit war crimes and 
conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity were dismissed as 
those charges were not recognized in international law.481 
The charge of belonging to a criminal organization was an offense 
recognized in the International Military Tribunal, but was viewed as 
problematic even in that proceeding.  The charge required proof that 
voluntary participation in a criminal organization (e.g., the SS, at a 
sufficiently high level with knowledge) would constitute a crime.482  
Only Altstötter was found guilty on that count alone.483  This count, 
while not technically one of conspiracy, certainly is its first cousin.  
There was little or no precedent for this change other than the IMT 
trial itself, and the charge essentially was a residue of the Bernays’ 
Memorandum.484  This count is the most doubtful of the counts in the 
case and Altstötter’s conviction the only questionable conviction in 
the trial. 
By contrast, the war crimes count was based on centuries of 
customary law and, since General Order 100 and the subsequent 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, codified law.  All of the defendants, 
with the exception of Altstötter, Rothaug, and those acquitted, were 
convicted of war crimes.485  
The charge of crimes against humanity was the great substantive 
innovation of the Nuremberg Trials.  In each of the NMT trials, the 
defendants moved to dismiss this count, but in eleven of the twelve 
trials, the tribunals declined to dismiss the count on the basis that 
ACC 10 had defined the tribunals’ jurisdiction to include crimes 
against humanity.486  The tribunal in the Justice Trial went further 
and addressed the fairness of the charges.  In the London Charter, the 
crime was defined as a crime in association with one of the other 
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offenses such as crimes against peace or war crimes.487  In fact, many 
crimes against humanity also constituted war crimes.  ACC 10 of 
course eliminated the “in association with” language, and thus 
seemed to show greater confidence in the charge.488  
In the IMT and in the NMT trials, the argument was made that 
crimes against humanity should be recognized as a natural extension 
of existing offenses, such as war crimes.489  As international criminal 
law should grow, like the common law, by application of existing 
principles to new situations, there was no ex-post facto application.  
Furthermore, and fundamentally, the defendants knew or should have 
known that what they were doing was wrong and that should 
Germany lose the war, there would be liability.  Interestingly, Telford 
Taylor seemed to agree that at least the offense of crimes against the 
peace was ex-post facto, but argued that the injustice would have 
been greater had the charge not been brought.490  The tribunal made a 
strong showing that whether the charge was ex-post facto or not, 
there was no injustice in applying the charge to these defendants.  
The defendants all argued in their defense that they were acting in 
accordance with German domestic law and that they did not have the 
option of disobedience or of holding the law invalid.491  This defense 
of dealing with the unjust Nazi laws has generated a veritable cottage 
industry among legal philosophers debating the nature of law.492  
Professor Hart, arguing from a positivist position, discussed a case in 
which a German court tried a German woman for the offense of 
having informed on her husband for having violated Nazi law, 
knowing that he would likely be convicted and executed.493  Hart 
argued that the German law in the Nazi era, although unjust and 
violating moral norms, was nevertheless law, and therefore it was 
unjust to convict her for making use of it.494  He acknowledged that, 
although the unjust law might have a claim of obedience over her, 
she would have had a moral imperative to disobey.495 
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Professor Lon Fuller, a modern natural law philosopher, responded 
to Hart’s article and made the argument that German law under the 
Nazis violated basic norms for the recognition of the validity of the 
law (e.g., the ad hoc application of rules).496  Thus, at a certain point 
Germany ceased to have a legal system at all.497  Therefore, the wife 
should not have been able to claim the protection of the law.498 
Ronald Dworkin, the leading interpretivist philosopher, criticizes 
Hart and the positivists for their semantic focus on the word law.  It 
certainly is correct that Nazi Germany had laws, which the 
government expected its subjects to obey and which most Germans 
obeyed.499  Hart was wrong, however, in rejecting the notion based 
on a deeper understanding of German law that it lacked fundamental 
characteristics of a flourishing legal system, and therefore, lacked the 
moral basis to command obedience. 
Fuller and Dworkin seemed to have the better of the argument.  
Certainly, the enactment of law by analogy in 1936 eliminated all 
certainty from the law.  Henceforth, judicial decisions would be 
whatever a judge, motivated by national socialist ideology, wanted it 
to be.  Among the defendants, the Ministry of Justice officials such as 
Schlegelberger, could not claim Hart’s approach as defense, as the 
Ministry of Justice officials were the drafters of the unjust laws.  
Prosecutors and judges, to the extent that their trials were shams, 
intended only to give a legal pretext to discriminatory and lethal 
conduct, and therefore, were departing from any reasonable concept 
of the law.  
One of the ironies about the development of the law under Nazism 
was that the fundamental positivist basis of German jurisprudence 
was negated by law by analogy.  This law, relying as it does on the 
“sound sentiments of the people,”500 in effect established a perverse 
form of natural law.  Traditional natural law theories assumed a 
fundamental transcendent structure of law found in nature and 
ordained by God (although Fuller’s version of natural law does not 
have a theological basis).501  National Socialist ideology, however, 
posited that the fundamental law of nature was a struggle for 
existence on the basis of race in which the fittest race would 
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survive.502  The “sound sentiment of the people,” in effect was an 
appeal to a higher legal or moral authority than positive law.503  Thus, 
the judges felt comfortable departing from existing written law 
relating to punishment, as an example, when they felt there to be a 
racial imperative to impose a higher sentence, such as with Leo 
Katzenberger, or the Polish farmworkers.  It is striking that although 
several of the defendants in the IMT, notably Speer, experienced 
remorse for their deeds, not one of the defendants in the Justice Trial 
did so.  
C. Was Justice Done? 
They defiled the German temple of justice . . . . The 
temple must be reconsecrated.  This cannot be done in 
the twinkling of an eye or by any mere ritual.  It cannot 
be done in any single proceeding or at any one place.  It 
certainly cannot be done at Nuernberg alone.504 
The defendants in this case, with the arguable exception of 
Altstötter, were fairly convicted.505  However, there were a number of 
interesting arguments offered in mitigation which must be considered 
in evaluating the overall fairness of the proceeding. 
In his opening statements, counsel for Rothenberger argued that the 
members of the tribunal had to recognize the difficulty of life in a 
dictatorship.506  Under circumstances in which arbitrary arrest or 
dismissal were possible, only the unusually courageous would go 
against the system.  Most people, including apparently most of the 
defendants, lost all initiative and acquiesced in the system despite 
personal objections. 
This argument would have greater strength were it not apparent that 
many of the defendants were members of the Nazi Party, and all had 
been willing to draft unjust laws or to willingly rule by analogy.507  It 
is striking that there was resistance to the Nazis in other areas of 
German society such as the Confessing Church, the White Rose, and 
the Kreisau Circle, among Christian groups, and the July 20, 1944 
 
502. See Dorothy Thompson, National Socialism: Theory and Practice, 13 FOREIGN AFF. 
557, 561–62 (1934). 
503. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
504. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 33 (opening statement of Brigadier 
General Telford Taylor) (emphasis added). 
505. See infra note 507 and accompanying text. 
506. JUSTICE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 146–47. 
507. See, e.g., id. at 25–26; Sfekas, supra note 32, at 220, 227. 
2017 Justice in the Justice Trial at Nuremberg 519 
 
conspiracy in the Army, and the aristocracy.508  There was no 
equivalent resistance among the judiciary.509 
Schlegelberger argued that what he did was a strategy designed to 
mitigate the worst parts of Nazi rule.510  He was in constant conflict 
with the SS, the Gestapo, and the Nazi Party to maintain judicial 
independence.  Thus, by accepting civil jurisdiction over the Night 
and Fog cases, he kept the victims from being turned over to the 
Gestapo for summary execution or immediate confinement in a 
concentration camp.511  His draft of the Law Against Poles and Jews 
was designed to maintain at least some semblance of legal process for 
Poles and Jews.512  He argued that his suggestion that half-Jews be 
given the option of sterilization rather than be deported to the East (to 
what he knew would be certain death) was the commission of a small 
evil to avoid the greater.513  In his final statement, he argued that he 
knew that his successors would be far worse than he and that he had a 
clear conscience.514 
Rothenberg made a similar argument.  He testified as an example 
that a lengthy memorandum he had written concerning a Nazi 
conception of law was ultimately intended to increase Hitler’s 
comfort level with the judiciary so that he would not feel it necessary 
to end judicial independence.515 
The tribunal took this argument seriously, particular with respect to 
Schlegelberger.516  However, the tribunal also noted that this strategy 
rather than tempering the demands of the regime instead facilitated 
them.517  The opinion notes that: “If the judiciary could slay their 
thousands, why couldn’t the police slay their tens of thousands?”518 
Thus, the tribunal nevertheless felt compelled to hand down severe 
sentences.  In the aftermath of the trials, as has been noted, every 
single defendant regardless of the severity of the offense or degree of 
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moral culpability was released early—most notably Schlegelberger in 
1951, only four years after the end of the trial.519 
Although justice was done in the trial itself, the disproportionately 
short sentences served constituted an injustice, particularly as the 
commutations of sentence were driven by political expediency rather 
than by legal or moral considerations.  Whether justice was done as 
to the individual defendants in this case, or for that matter their 
victims, who received no restitution and perhaps retribution for their 
suffering, this trial and the NMT trial in general served larger 
interests of justice. 
The Justice Trial and the other NMT trials exposed to the world 
and to the German public the crimes of the Nazis and of German 
society in a way that was credible and fair.520  It was precisely 
because the defendants had a full opportunity afforded by a trial to 
challenge the prosecution’s case, to present their own witnesses and 
introduce documents, that we have a full record of the Nazi era.  
Every book and article on the German legal system relies on the 
record of the Justice Trial.  The NMT trials also were an important 
part of post-war efforts to define more clearly the laws of war and 
crimes against humanity.  In fact, the trials preceded the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions,521 which further defined the laws of war and crimes 
against humanity, as well as the Genocide Convention.  
The cycle of Nuremberg trials should perhaps best be understood as 
part of a general effort to create a new and just world order.  
Nuremberg was part of an effort internationally, including the Four 
Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the formation of the United Nations, 
and the series of post-war treaties defining the laws of war and 
international humanitarian law, including, most notably, the Geneva 
Convention of 1949, the Genocide Convention, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to establish new norms of international 
conduct and to create a rule-based system to govern international 
conflict.  Indeed, the trials created the precedent of personal criminal 
responsibility, which would ultimately give these treaties greater bite.  
The Justice Trial, in particular, established the precedent that judges, 
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prosecutors, and legal officials would enjoy no immunities for sham 
legal proceedings or for the misuse of the law for purposes of 
justifying war crimes or crimes against humanity.522  Telford Taylor, 
in the opening of the Justice Trial, stated that: “The temple [of 
justice] must be reconsecrated,” in reference to the German legal 
system.523  By the mid-1960s, Germany in fact was conducting its 
own war crimes trials.524 
In the third play of the Oresteia Trilogy, the Furies, ancient 
goddesses of vengeance, pursue Orestes, son of Agamemnon, to 
avenge his murder of his mother.525  The goddess Athena convenes a 
trial which acquits Orestes and the Furies accept the result.526  Athena 
states that a new civilization will result from the replacement of 
revenge by law.527 
The postwar treatment of the German leadership could have taken 
many forms—from exile to summary execution to inaction.  The 
trials that did take place documented Nazi atrocities in a manner 
convincing to all but the Holocaust deniers, vindicated the suffering 
of the victims, and established both international standards for fair 
trials and useful precedent for future international criminal trials.  
Most importantly, the trials helped to end the cycle of retribution and 
violence which threatened to destroy postwar Europe.  Although the 
Justice Trial and NMT trials in general achieved only partial success 
with respect to individual defendants, they were a material advance in 
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